Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China by Minzner, Carl F.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2009
Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control
of Local Agents in China
Carl F. Minzner
Fordham University School of Law, cminzner@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Foreign Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carl F. Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China, 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 53 (2009-2010)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/6
RIOTS AND COVER-UPS:
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE CONTROL OF
LOCAL AGENTS IN CHINA
CARL F. MINZNER*
ABSTRACT
Chinese cadre responsibility systems are a core element of
Chinese law and governance. These top-down personnel systems
set concrete target goals linked to official salaries and career
advancement. Judges and courts face annual targets for
permissible numbers of mediated, reversed, and closed cases;
Communist Party secretaries and government bureaus face similar
targets for allowable numbers of protests, traffic accidents, and
mine disasters. For many local Chinese officials, these targets have
a much more direct impact on their behavior than do formal legal
and regulatory norms.
This Article argues that Chinese authorities are dependent on
responsibility systems, particularly their use of strict, vicarious,
and collective liability principles, as an institutional tool to address
pervasive principal-agent problems they face in governing a large
authoritarian bureaucracy. But excessive reliance on these
methods to control local officials ironically fuels governance
problems that Chinese central leaders seek to address. Central
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Chinese authorities do not want township officials colluding to
falsify tax records or engaging in ill-conceived development
projects that waste central funds. Nor do they want rural residents
burning down government buildings or staging mass petitions to
Beijing to protest the actions of local officials. But these are the
direct results of cadre evaluation systems that Chinese authorities
use to govern their local agents.
Continued reliance on responsibility systems as a tool of
governance raises significant conflicts with the legal reforms that
Chinese authorities have pursued since 1978. And recent
developments suggest that central Chinese authorities may be
backing away from their efforts to govern China, and their local
agents, through law and legal institutions. At least some leaders
appear to favor an alternative strategy- strengthening the role of
responsibility systems as a tool for monitoring local agents. This is
a fundamental conflict over the core question of how to govern
China. How it is resolved will have lasting implications for
China's domestic evolution and stability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Their tactics were brutal and rapacious. In May 2007, local
officials in the southwestern Chinese province of Guangxi
descended on Bobai county in a campaign aimed at enforcing
China's population laws and meeting target goals for allowable
numbers of births in their jurisdiction. They forced pregnant
women to have abortions. They demolished homes to make
residents cough up fines demanded for excess children. Citizen
anger boiled over into rioting. Thousands of angry rural residents
took to the streets, sacking government offices in protest.1
The vicious nature of the local Guangxi enforcement campaign
was all the more striking because it directly conflicted with the
explicit orders of China's top leaders. Just months before, in
January 2007, Central Communist Party ("Party") and government
officials had issued a joint directive ordering stronger enforcement
of China's population planning laws -precisely the aim of
Guangxi authorities. However, the national directive clearly
limited the measures to be used. It banned forced abortions,
emphasized financial aid to reward compliance with birth control
policies, and downplayed the use of coercive measures to punish
noncompliance. 2 Indeed, the director of China's national family
planning council even suggested that national authorities would
waive fines entirely for poor Chinese citizens.3
What explains such a striking disconnect between the central
aims and the local realities? Conflicting norms governing official
behavior are a key factor. Local cadre responsibility systems
employed to evaluate the performance of Party and government
officials do not necessarily correspond with central laws and
policies. In April, 2007, Bobai county Party and government
officials issued an implementation plan for the national population
planning efforts. The plan designated hard enforcement targets.
1 This paragraph, as well as some of the material in the following two, is
adapted from a prior-op-ed by the author. See Carl Minzner, Op-Ed., Corruption
in China: The Anger Boils Over, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 29, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/opinion/29iht-edminzer.1.5912729.htn-.
2 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu quanmian jiaqiang renkou he
jihua shengyu gongzuo tongchou jiejue renkou wenti de jueding [Communist
Central Party Committee and State Council Decision on Comprehensively
Strengthening Population Planning Work], issued Jan. 22, 2007 (P.R.C.), available at
http://w-ww1.www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2007/content_534194. htm.
3 Maureen Fan, China May Lower Fines for Poor Who Violate One-Child-Only
Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2007, at A7.
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For example, it required each Party, government, or state-owned
enterprise employee to successfully raise 500 yuan in "social
compensation" fees from residents who had borne children in
excess of population planning laws, and to get one local resident to
undergo a tubal ligation or "other remedial measure" by the end of
August. Failure of individual state employees to make target
resulted in loss of their annual salary bonus and forfeiture of any
possibility for career promotion or honors that year. Failure of
township governments to reach their collective targets resulted in
all township employees receiving similar penalties for up to two
years. 4
Bobai county authorities were not ignorant of the central
authorities' instructions. Their plan was aimed at implementing it.
Indeed, their plan specifically called for the January directive to be
printed in booklet form and distributed to local cadres and farmers
as part of an education campaign to accompany enforcement
efforts.5 But township officials were placed in an untenable
situation. Sure, the central directive set out broad behavioral
norms, but the county plan set clear, hard targets directly linked to
their salaries and careers. In such a situation, violating national
rules (and laws) to aggressively fulfill specific work targets was
simply rational economic behavior.
Conflict between national law or central directives and local
cadre evaluation systems occurs in numerous areas of Chinese law
and governance. China has enacted extensive environmental laws
and regulations, but Party personnel evaluations of local officials
used to determine their career advancement and promotion have
traditionally placed heavy emphasis on economic growth statistics.
This incentivizes some local officials to violate relevant laws, falsify
GDP statistics to superiors, and blindly engage in development
4 It also specified enforcement timetables, detailed county-level Party cadres
to assist township authorities with enforcement, and detached a vice-president of
the local court to head a special unit for the rapid trials of residents who resisted.
See Li Yijin & Liu Yadong, Bobai County Government website, Bobai yi wushi de
zuofeng dada renkou jihua shengyu gongzuo fanshezhang [Through Pragmatism in
Attacking the Problem of Population Planning, Bobai [County] Will Bring About A
Turnaround], BoxuN.CoM, Apr. 30, 2007, http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china
/2007/05/200705210347.shtml (describing the Bobai county plan to implement
population planning policy after receiving a "yellow card" from Guangxi
Autonomous Region authorities for their failure to achieve policy targets).
5 Id.
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projects in an effort to reach their annual targets.6 National
regulations bar local authorities from retaliating against citizen
petitioners who seek to bring complaints before higher authorities. 7
However, Party cadre evaluation systems heavily stress social
order statistics. These sanction local Party secretaries based on the
number of citizen petitioners who leave the jurisdiction to present
grievances to higher-level officials. This leads local officials to
resort to repressive tactics (including illegal detentions) to prevent
petitioners from reaching higher officials and thereby negatively
affecting the career prospects of local officials.8
These examples reflect an alternative incentive structure
created by the target responsibility systems (zeren zhuijiu zhi,
mubiao guanli zeren zhi) that are the core of the Chinese Party and
government cadre evaluation process. These personnel systems set
concrete target goals linked to officials' salaries and career
advancement. They apply sanctions and rewards based on strict,
collective, and vicarious liability for the failure (or success) of
officials and their units in attaining designated targets. As Chinese
scholars have noted, this creates a "pressurized" environment in
which making target (or appearing to do so) is all-important.9 For
many ordinary local Chinese officials, these targets have a much
6 Pan Yue: Yao queli lase GDP zai zhengji kaohe zhong de hexin diwei [Pan Yue:
The Core Role of Green GDP Must be Established in Officials' Evaluation Process],
BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com
/newscenter/2005-03/01/content_2631570.htm.
7 Xinfang tiaoli [Xinfang Regulations] (promulgated by State Council of the
People's Republic of China, Jan. 10, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) 2005 ST. COUNCIL
GAz, art. 3 (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.gjxfj.gov.cn/2006-03/07
/content_6399309.htm.
8 Carl Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42
STAN. J. INT'L. L. 103 (2006). Local taxation provides another example. Some
county-level authorities impose hard tax revenue targets that township officials
are expected to generate. Failure results in deductions from annual bonuses, or
negative notations in official career files. Success results in retention of the excess
funds generated. In relatively poorer regions of central and western China, this
fuels a range of illegal behavior and corruption as local officials strike backroom
deals with companies outside the local jurisdiction to falsely report taxes within
the jurisdiction in return for a discount (or kickback) on the taxes paid. See, e.g.,
Zhongxi bu chuxian xiangzhen mai shui bao zhi zhengji xianxiang [Central and
Western China Experience Township Officials 'Buying Tax Receipts' in Order to
Cook up Official Evaluation Results], Politics.People.com, Sept. 21, 2006,
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/4840559.html.
9 Tony Saich, The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analyzing the Local State in China,
in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM 75, 94 (Luigi Tomba ed., 2002).
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more direct impact on their behavior than abstract legal and
regulatory norms.
The existence of two separate sets of normative rules governing
official behavior-legal norms enacted by state institutions and
Party-managed cadre responsibility systems-means that the
possibility for conflict is always latent. In some instances, this
simply leads to the emergence of quiet divergences and systematic
inconsistencies, as local officials respond to the more direct
personnel incentives created by responsibility systems that poorly
reflect the purported aims of national law. In other cases, this
tension erupts into spectacular violations of legal norms that
central authorities have publicly promulgated.
Given the critical nature of cadre responsibility systems-
officially promulgated instructions to local Party and government
authorities as to what their responsibilities are, and what
punishments or rewards will result from failure or compliance -it
is surprising how sparsely they are analyzed in the existing
literature. Political scientists have begun to explore cadre
responsibility systems as a subject in the last few years.10 But
almost no literature exists examining the interaction of
responsibility systems with the Chinese legal system. Legal
academic literature has extensively studied formal legal norms
promulgated by central institutions such as the Supreme People's
Court ("SPC") and National People's Congress ("NPC"), but
responsibility systems have been ignored. As one prominent
American scholar of Chinese law has noted, local court
responsibility systems and the incentives they create for Chinese
judges are "terra incognita in terms of published systematic
studies.""
All significant studies of Chinese law, of course, do remark on
the core role of the Chinese Communist Party.12 However, they
10 See Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre
Management from a Township Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 35, 38-40 (2003) (analyzing
the operations of Party cadre responsibility systems); Susan H. Whiting, The Cadre
Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule, in HOLDING CHINA
TOGETHER 101, 112-15 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004) (arguing that
cadre responsibility systems are linked to dysfunctional policy implementation).
11 Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164,
178 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003).
12 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW
211-223, 302-09 (2002); STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN
CHINA AFTER MAO 253-58, 263-67 (1999) (discussing how the Party remains
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tend to depict the Party as an external force intervening in legal
institutions and processes -ordering the arrest and convictions of
dissidents, controlling the nominations of top judges, and
supervising the operations of the procuratorate and courts through
Party political-legal committees. Few have focused on the internal
role of Party committees and organization bureaus in setting
performance targets that incentivize particular behavior of local
officials through the use of salary and career rewards.
Furthermore, prior literature has not fully examined core
questions regarding the reasons underlying the use of responsibility
systems. 13 What institutional role do these systems fill, particularly
their reliance on strict, vicarious, and collective liability principles?
Why do Chinese authorities rely on these systems when they create
problematic behavioral incentives for local officials that compete,
conflict, and sometimes completely violate norms that central
authorities have promulgated?
China's authoritarian political system and a lack of
commitment to legal norms that might curtail state power are part
of the picture, but they do not fully explain it. The strict, vicarious,
and collective liability regimes embodied in cadre responsibility
systems create perverse incentives for local officials to violate not
only central legal norms, but also central Party ones. This
generates significant practical problems for central authorities.
Incentives established under local responsibility systems press
local officials to engage in abuses of power that national authorities
would very much like to stamp out. Central Chinese authorities
do not want local township officials colluding to falsify tax records
or engaging in ill-conceived development projects that waste
central funds. Nor do they want rural residents burning down
local government buildings. Nonetheless, these are direct results
of the cadre evaluation systems that Chinese authorities use to
govern their local agents. So, why?
embedded in Chinese legal institutions and how it influences the appointment
and removal of Chinese judges); JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 5-18, 71-96, 131-141
(1968).
13 Neither comprehensive studies of Chinese governance that stress the
declining institutional capabilities of the Party center to monitor local officials, nor
those that emphasize the institutional resilience of central authorities in
addressing these problems, analyze these systems. See, e.g., DAVID SHAMBAUGH,
CHINA'S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION 128-60 (2008); MINXIN PEI,
CHINA'S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY 144-66
(2006).
2009]
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This Article fills this void. It is divided into three main parts.
Part 2 outlines the nature and history of Chinese responsibility
systems. It also identifies their key shared characteristics: Party-
managed personnel systems, based on principles of strict,
collective, and vicarious liability, linking the career advancement
and salaries of officials to their success or failure in meeting
designated goals.
Part 2 also identifies the institutional role that responsibility
systems play in Chinese law and governance. They are critical
governance mechanisms for Chinese leaders to steer and manage a
massive bureaucracy. In particular, the widespread application of
strict, vicarious, and collective liability through the bureaucratic
personnel system is a top-down response by authoritarian Chinese
central rulers (imperial and Party alike) who are seeking to address
severe principal-agent problems and informational gaps in
monitoring their local officials, but who remain very
uncomfortable with allowing the emergence of independent,
bottom-up institutional channels to respond to these problems.
Part 3 examines the negative side effects produced by central
Chinese reliance on responsibility systems to govern- particularly
their excessive reliance on strict, vicarious, and collective liability.
This strategy creates incentives that fuel a range of abuses by local
officials, including cover-ups, corruption, and distorted policy
implementation. Ironically, Chinese leaders' existing strategy for
addressing the principal-agent problem at the heart of the Chinese
bureaucracy is itself a significant source and cause of the
governance problems they are seeking to address.
Part 4 suggests how our understanding of the Chinese legal
system may need to change in light of this Article's analysis. It
calls for the study of Chinese law to expand beyond formal law
and recognize the functional role that internal Party regulations
play within the bureaucratic system. Explicitly examining them
may be essential to understanding (or altering) the actual incentive
structures that affect the behavior of Chinese officials.
Finally, this Part raises important questions regarding the
future evolution of the Chinese legal and political system. The
governance strategy embodied in responsibility systems exists in
uneasy tension with formal legal norms promulgated by the
Chinese state in the post-1978 reform period. It conflicts with an
alternative conception of "law" supported by Chinese legal
reformers, a view that sees law as outside of, and perhaps an
alternative to, the top-down bureaucratic personnel control
[Vol. 31:1
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mechanisms on which Chinese authorities have traditionally relied
to govern.
Recent developments, however, suggest that central Chinese
authorities may be backing away from their decades-long effort to
govern China and their local agents, through law and legal
institutions. At least some leaders appear to favor an alternative
strategy -strengthening the role of responsibility systems as a tool
for monitoring their local agents. This is a fundamental conflict
over the core issue of how to govern the world's largest nation.
How it is resolved will have lasting implications for China's
domestic evolution and stability.
2. RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS
2.1. Background.
Modern Chinese responsibility systems are not new. They are
lineal descendants of governance practices employed by
generations of imperial and Party authorities to administer a
sprawling authoritarian bureaucracy.
One of the world's earliest bureaucratic systems, the imperial
Chinese state endured under different dynastic successors (with
some interruptions) from 221 BCE to 1911 CE. A concentration of
formal power characterized imperial governance. At the top,
ultimate authority rested in the hands of the emperor. At the
bottom, the imperial Chinese state fused all political and judicial
authority in the hands of district magistrates, each responsible for
the affairs of an individual county.14 In order to effectively manage
their local agents, central authorities relied on an extensive system
of regular personnel evaluation and review. Magistrates with
superior performance received promotions, those with poor
performance suffered censure and fines.15
Central imperial authorities faced a classic principal-agent
problem in managing the bureaucracy. The concentration of
power in the hands of individual magistrates, combined with their
control over channels of information and reporting to higher
14 DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 4-5, 114 (1967);
JOHN R. WATT, THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 11-21 (1972).
15 T'UNG-TSU CH'u, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 32-33
(1962) (describing the system of promotions and disciplinary measures for
magistrates); WEI QINGYUAN, ZHONGGUO GUANZHI SHI [HISTORY OF THE CHINESE
BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM] 382-99 (2001).
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authorities, generated real problems in evaluating local officials.
How was the center to assess the accuracy of magistrate reports
regarding local governance? Was the local magistrate telling the
truth that the decline in annual tax revenue from his county was
the result of external factors, or was he simply covering up his own
corruption or incompetence? 16
Chinese emperors adopted a range of strategies in response.
Increased direct top-down supervision was one method they
employed. Emperors attempted to open alternative channels of
information to evaluate magistrates' performance -channels that
did not depend on (potentially distorted) self-reporting by
magistrates themselves. Perhaps the best-known example of these
efforts was the imperial censorate. Chinese emperors established a
group of high-level authorities (censors) and endowed them with
wide-ranging powers to investigate governance problems
throughout the country. Emperors attempted to use the censorate
to carry out an end-run around information blockages at lower
levels of the Chinese bureaucracy, authorizing censors to bypass
ordinary reporting channels and provide recommendations and
reports directly to the throne.17
However, such efforts at direct supervision faced fundamental
constraints. Censors were few in number. No guarantee existed
that their reports were entirely free from bias or self-serving
political ingratiation. Most importantly, the nature of the censorate
as a tool for the emperor's personal supervision of the bureaucracy
imposed inherent limits. Censors could serve as a myriad of "eyes
and ears" to funnel a mass of information directly to the emperor,
but they were not permitted to usurp his ultimate power of
decision.18 This dependence on a single individual (or "brain") to
take action on a mass of censorial reports (from the "eyes and
ears") meant that the utility of such direct supervision mechanisms
depended on the available time and energy of the reigning
emperor. Faced with an overworked or incompetent emperor, or
one who preferred to spend time with the imperial concubines
16 THOMAS A. METZGER, THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF CH'ING
BUREAUCRACY: LEGAL, NORMATIVE, AND COMMUNICATION ASPECTS 289-91 (1973).
17 Lawrence J.R. Herson, China's Imperial Bureaucracy: Its Direction and Control,
17 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 44,48 (1957).
18 Id.; Jonathan K. Ocko, I'll Take it All the Way to Beijing: Capital Appeals in the
Qing, 47 J. ASIAN STuD. 291, 296 (1988).
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rather than managing matters of state, unread censorial reports
simply piled up, and the system lost effectiveness.
Confronted with the inherent limitations of direct top-down
oversight, the imperial Chinese system developed other
mechanisms to help monitor magistrates. Strict liability was one
alternative. Magistrates received automatic sanctions for a range
of specified failings, such as failing to meet designated quotas for
tax revenue from their jurisdictions.19 Imperial administrative
regulations and the criminal code imposed corporal punishments
for any magistrate whose judicial decision was reversed on appeal,
regardless of the reason.20 Strict liability reduced the need for
higher-level authorities to inquire into the reasons behind every
particular governance failure. Strict liability also introduced strong
incentives for magistrates to exert themselves to avoid reversal or
other specified outcomes leading to sanctions.
The imperial Chinese system also responded to principal-agent
monitoring problems by widely employing collective and vicarious
liability. This allowed central authorities to partially offload
monitoring responsibilities by creating strong incentives for lower-
level authorities to watch each other. The Ming Code, for example,
applied collective criminal liability to the colleagues and
supervisors of magistrates and other officials who committed
inadvertent errors (not just intentional crimes) in the course of their
public duties.21 Imperial regulations held magistrates personally
responsible for the infractions of their subordinate clerks or
runners, such as embezzlement or abuse of authority.22
Magistrates used similar principles to govern their subordinates. 23
In one late-19th-century Sichuan example, two local police
constables took a detainee to a local opium den, proceeded to
smoke themselves into a stupor, and permitted the prisoner to
escape. In addition to ordering the beating of the two constables
involved, the local magistrate also decreed that all head runners in
19 See CH'u, supra note 15, at 32-33 (describing the system for promotion and
punishment of magistrates); WATT, supra note 14, at 18-19 (describing the
disciplinary regulations imposed on officials).
20 Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The
Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives on, 39 N.M. L. REv. 63 (2009).
21 THE GREAT MING CODE lxviii (iang Yonglin trans., 2005).
22 CH'O, supra note 15, at 70-73.
23 BRADLY W. REED, TALONS AND TEETH: COuNTY CLERKS AND RUNNERS IN THE
QING DYNASTY 126-27 (2000).
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the division would face penal confinement if the escaped prisoner
was not recaptured within fifteen days.24
The collapse of imperial dynastic rule in 1911 did not spell the
end of the Chinese bureaucratic state. Both Nationalist (post-1927)
and Communist (post-1949) authorities re-established extensive
authoritarian bureaucracies after seizing power. Regularized top-
down personnel control was a key element of their rule.25 To
ensure the loyalty of its cadres, Communist personnel systems
implemented during the 1950s required regular assessments of the
local officials' political attitudes. These assessments were entered
into individuals' permanent personnel dossiers, and used for
deciding promotions (and demotions) throughout the
bureaucracy.2 6
Party authorities also experimented with making defined work
targets a component of local officials' performance evaluations. In
the early 1950s, Chinese authorities imported industrial
management methods from the Soviet Union as part of
establishing a state-run economy. In particular, Chinese officials
borrowed the concepts of "responsibility systems" and "one-man
management." These top-down systems set production targets for
individual factories, and held factory managers personally
responsible for ensuring that their work units made target. Success
resulted in rewards; failure in sanctions. Factory managers
received sweeping decision-making authority regarding how to
make these targets, with broad powers to set quotas and
compensation standards for subordinates as a means to push them
to realize work unit goals.27
Such top-down management systems were marginalized as
tools of Chinese bureaucratic supervision, however, during the two
24 Id.
25 PATRICIA M. THORNTON, DISCIPLINING THE STATE: VIRTUE, VIOLENCE, AND
STATE-MAKING IN MODERN CHINA, 81-83, 141-44 (2007). Top-down personnel
control included strategies of mandatory self-reporting by local officials, as well as
the use of top-down inspections by higher-level work teams that paralleled
imperial censorate practices. See JEAN C. OI, STATE AND PEASANT IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VILLAGE GOVERNMENT, 84-103 (1989). In the
face of such management techniques, local officials countered with a range of
strategies for evading and concealing negative information. Id., at 104-130.
26 A. DOAK BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN
COMMUNIST CHINA, 166-68 (1967).
27 See generally FRANZ SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN
COMMUNIST CHINA, 242-62 (2d ed. 1968) (describing top-down Chinese
management systems).
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decades of political radicalism that began in the late 1950s.
Partially as a result of their decades-long experience leading a
revolutionary movement, Party leaders such as Mao Zedong
distrusted bureaucracy. They feared it would lead inexorably to
the distancing of officials from the people, and the dimming of
revolutionary ardor among the masses. Party authorities
consequently relied on frequent (and chaotic) rectification
campaigns involving highly politicized bottom-up mass
participation as a preferred governance tool to supervise the
bureaucracy. 28  Campaigns involved mass rallies, public
denunciations, and mandatory self-criticism by accused officials.
The aims of these campaigns were to expose the work errors of
local officials (and of citizens themselves) and to ferret out
disloyalty and incompetence.29 Political campaigns led to regular
upheavals in the bureaucracy, and were a prime factor in the
highly unstable political climate that marked China from the late
1950s until the mid-1970s. 30  The prevailing anti-bureaucratic
emphasis of this period also led to a rollback of experiments with
top-down target-based responsibility systems in the economic
sphere. State-owned factory managers were instead expected to
maintain close contact with the workers, accept bottom-up
supervision and suggestions, and lead from the factory floor.31
The onset of the reform period in the 1970s saw a shift back
toward the official use of incentive-based target systems. This first
took place in agriculture. Dissatisfied with the economic
stagnation that resulted from Maoist agricultural policies that
separated actual work from economic rewards, 32 central Chinese
authorities undertook radical reforms. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, they authorized local experimentation with "household
contract responsibility systems" and "production responsibility
systems." These set production quotas for individual households
or work teams, devolved authority to them to decide exactly how
28 Kevin J. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, Selective Policy Implementation in Rural
China, Comparative Politics, 31 COMP. POL. 167, 172 (1999).
29 HARRY HARDING, ORGANIZING CHINA: THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY, 1948-
1976, 165-77, 277 (1981).
30 O'Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 172.
31 SCHURMANN, supra note 27, at 287-93.
32 Graham E. Johnson, The Production Responsibility System in Chinese
Agriculture: Some Examples from Guangdong, 55 PAC. AFF. 430, 431-32 (1982). See
also Robert F. Ash, The Evolution of Agricultural Policy, 116 CHINA Q. 529, 536-37
(1988).
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to meet the targets, and allowed production teams and households
to collectively reap any excess generated for exceeding the
targets. 33 These reforms established strong production incentives
for farmers, and fueled China's massive agricultural and economic
boom in the 1980s and 1990s.
Similar changes took place in the political arena. Traumatized
by the turbulence of the Maoist era, central Party authorities
reduced (but did not completely eliminate) the use of political
campaigns as a tool to manage local officials. In their place,
officials turned to a revised cadre evaluation system. Beginning in
1979, central Party authorities began to shift cadre evaluation
systems to emphasize concrete and quantifiable performance
standards, such as foreign investment generated or GDP growth,
rather than political-ideological ones. Whiting notes that this "was
seen in part as a means to break the paralysis of many cadres
following the Cultural Revolution and to actively mobilize cadres
to pursue specific goals set by their superiors." 34 In 1988, central
Party authorities drafted national guidelines detailing the broad
categories of work targets to be used to evaluate county-level Party
secretaries and government leaders. These provided that results of
the evaluations should be linked to career rewards and penalties.
They also encouraged competition between cadres based on their
success in fulfilling targets.35
These reforms rippled down through the Chinese bureaucracy.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, legal institutions (such as local
courts and procuratorates) and administrative organs (such as
birth control agencies) adopted responsibility systems based on
work targets. As with their Party counterparts, these systems
aimed at strengthening top-down supervision of lower-level
officials and establishing positive incentives for good work.36
33 Johnson, supra note 32, at 436-39.
34 Whiting, supra note 10, at 104. See also, Melanie Manion, The Cadre
Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of
Party and State Leaders, 102 CHINA Q. 203, 226-30 (1985) (describing a variety of
cadre assessment methods); Yasheng Huang, Administrative Monitoring in China,
143 CHINA Q. 828, 830-31 (1995) (describing systems for monitoring cadres).
35 Whiting, supra note 10, at 109-10.
36 MAO HONGJUAN, YINCHUAN LAW ASSN'N, CUO'AN ZEREN ZHUIJIU ZHI CHUTAN
[PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS FOR INCORRECTLY
DECIDED CASES] (2006), available at http://www.nxyclawyer.com/llyj/html
/929.html (discussing the establishment of judicial responsibility systems for
incorrect decided cases starting in the 1990s and their effects). See also Di Tianli,
Woguo xianxing shenpan yunxing jizhi ruogan wenti sikao [Thoughts on Some Problems
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2.2. Content
Chinese authorities use cadre responsibility systems (mubiao
guanhi zeren zhi, zeren zhuijiu zhi) to evaluate and discipline Party
and government officials. These generally set a range of
performance targets, often numerical, that are linked to career
rewards and sanctions. This Section briefly analyzes how these
systems operate in Party, administrative, and judicial organs.
Efforts to make generalizations about Chinese responsibility
systems encounter difficulties. First, precise details vary across
bureaus and regions. Given a state sector of some 60 million
employees - more than the entire population of most European
countries - this can lead to significant differences.37  Second,
judicial, government, and Party rules establishing responsibility
systems are not systematically filed or published. Third, internal
Party documents governing cadre evaluation policies can be
sensitive, hampering efforts to systematically collect data. Fourth,
Chinese government regulations bar foreign organizations and
individuals from independently collecting survey data.
Regulations also bar foreigners from obtaining such data from
Chinese organizations that have not received government
authorization to share it.38
with the Operation of China's Existing Adjudication System], 3 ZHENGFA LUNCONG
[COMMENTARY ON LAW AND POLITICS] (2002); Zhejiang Provincial Birth Control
Agency Website, http://jsw.zj.gov.cn/jsw/node10/node27/node77
/userobjectlai5122.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) (noting that population and
family planning authorities began to establish responsibility systems in the late
1980s); Jiceng jianchayuan gongzuo lianghua guanli chuyi [Humble Opinions on
the Management of Work Evaluation of Basic-Level Procuratorates] (promulgated
by Jingmen City, Dongbao District, Basic-Level Procuratorate, effective April 25,
2005) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.jingshan.jcy.gov.cn/ReadNews.asp
?NewsID=477 (discussing the history of work evaluation and management in
basic-level Procuratorates).
37 NAT'L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, 2007 CHINESE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
(2007), available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/jsj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm.
38 See Shewai diaocha guanli banfa, [Measures on the Management of
Foreign-Related Surveys], issued Oct. 13, 2004, arts. 9, 10-20, 22 (P.R.C.) available
at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfg/gzjgfxwj/t20041018_402200576.htm (setting out
the rules by which foreign scholars and researchers are required to abide in order
to conduct survey research in China, including locating an approved Chinese
organization willing to serve as a partner, and submitting the proposed survey
questions or interview proposals for government approval). Some foreign
researchers and organizations do conduct surveys and research in violation of
these rules. They risk government suppression. See Nick Young, Why China
Cracked Down on My Nonprofit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 4, 2007, at 9; Nick
Young, Message From the Editor, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com
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Nonetheless, careful study of publicly available Chinese
responsibility systems reveals certain shared characteristics. These
characteristics are shared across Party, administrative, and judicial
organs, confirmed by the findings of other scholars who have done
research on the subject, and correspond with the personal accounts
of Chinese officials themselves who are subject to them.
Heimer and Whiting outline the Party responsibility systems
facing the core political leaders in local Chinese government-
county and township Party secretaries.39 These systems establish
comprehensive annual targets for a given jurisdiction. Specific
targets include: economic development, tax collection, Party
building, poverty alleviation, birth control, and social order.
Targets are assigned point values that leaders receive for meeting
them. Vicarious liability applies. Party leaders of local
governments that meet their targets (and outperform other
jurisdictions or leaders) may be personally designated as
"advanced leaders," awarded enhanced chances for promotion, or
receive substantial financial bonuses.40 Control over the evaluation
process rests with Party organization bureau officials.41
Targets differ in importance. Less important targets (such as
local educational statistics) may be "soft targets" that constitute
one factor among many used to assess official performance. In
contrast, exceptionally important targets may be designated
"priority targets with veto power" (yipiao fojue). Failure to attain
these targets unilaterally cancels out all positive work performance
in other fields. The yipiaofojue designation is reserved for a limited
number of targets identified by higher-level Party authorities as
critically important. For example, birth control and social order
/node/508 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) (discussing a Chinese government
crackdown on one foreign NGO, specifically banning its founder from returning
to China for "conducting 'unauthorized surveys'" in violation of the Statistics
Law).
39 Edin, supra note 10, at 38-40; Maria Heimer, The Cadre Responsibility System
and the Changing Needs of the Party, in THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN REFORM
122,129 (Kjeld Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian eds., 2006); Whiting, supra note 10.
40 See Edin, supra note 10, at 39-45 (describing the cadre reward system); see
also Whiting, supra note 10, at 111 (noting one case in which the financial bonus
received by a village Party secretary under the local responsibility system
accounted for 85% of his total income).
41 See PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA 13541
(2008) (describing the hierarchy of cadre supervision).
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targets - expressed in terms of permissible numbers of births and
collective petitions/protests - often receive such designation.42
Some Party responsibility systems apply strict liability to
officials and bureaus for failure (or success) in making target. For
example, the 2007 Xiaoji township responsibility system specifies
numerical point deductions (and awards) for a range of negative
(and positive) outcomes. Some targets are clearly within the
control of local officials, such as deductions for their own tardiness
or for playing cards at work. Other targets are less clearly within
their control. Examples include sanctions for participation rates of
local farmers in rural health collectives falling below 85%,
outbreaks of wildfires exceeding fifty mou (8.2 acres), the outbreak
of collective petitions of local citizens to higher authorities, and the
(re)occurrence of religious heterodoxy among local residents. 43
Importantly, the system makes no allowance for why the specified
outcome occurred. The events might be the direct result of a local
Party head's dereliction of duty. Alternatively, they might take
place despite her best efforts to prevent them.
Party responsibility systems often apply collective sanctions. If
a given Party or government entity exceeds others in their target
rankings, the entire unit may be designated as "advanced," with
resulting financial and career rewards for the unit and its members
(in addition to the leader). Low-rated units receive corresponding
collective sanctions.44
Responsibility systems also permeate the Chinese
administrative state. Provincial health authorities set
comprehensive annual targets for hospitals.45  Environmental
42 See Edin, supra note 10, at 38-40 (explaining the importance placed upon
family planning and social order policies by the Communist Party); Whiting, supra
note 10, at 112-15; see also Maria Edin, Remaking the Communist Party-State: The
Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China, 1 CHINA INT'L J. 1, 10 (2003)
(noting the parallel between priority targets that are enforced nationwide in
China - family planning and social order (shehui zhi'an) - and the policy priorities
of the Communist Party).
43 Zhonggong Xiaoji zhen weiyuanhui, Xiaoji zhen renmin zhengfu guanyu
2007 nian jiguan ganbu gangwei mubiao kaohe de yijian [Xiaoji Township Party
Committee and People's Government Opinion Regarding the 2007 Annual
Evaluation under the Cadre Target Responsibility System], issued Mar. 28, 2007
(P.R.C.), available at http://xinxi.haiyang.gov.cn/zhenqu/ArticleShow.asp
?ArticleID=582.
44 Edin, supra note 10, at 41, 45.
45 See Jiangsu sheng weisheng ting zhishu danwei 2005 niandu zonghe
mubiao guanli zeren zhi kaohe zhibiao [Jiangsu Provincial Health Department
2005 Comprehensive Target Management Responsibility System and Evaluation
2009]
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authorities set targets for subordinate bureaus and municipal
governments. 46  Transportation officials do so as well.47  For
example, Hebei provincial transportation authorities rate
subordinate railroad, port, and road bureaus on a 100-point
evaluation scale. Points are deducted based on the number of
transportation accidents and deaths occurring annually in their
jurisdiction. Accidents resulting in 1-2 deaths result in the loss of
5-10 points; 3-9 deaths result in the loss of 10-20 points.48 Bureaus
with annual ratings exceeding designated levels receive
recognition and reward. Bureaus that fail to meet minimum
standards suffer reprobation and sanction.49 Accidents causing
thirty or more deaths, involving children, or creating a "serious
domestic impact," are "priority targets with veto power," and
cause the relevant bureau to fail automatically.50
Standards for Subordinate Work Units], issued 2005 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.jswst.gov.cn/attachment/jgyy.doc (listing targets and associated
points awarded to Jiangsu provincial medical personnel and hospitals for meeting
or failing to meet them)
46 See Carlos Lo & Shui-yan Tang, Institutional Reform: Economic Changes, and
Local Environmental Management in China, 15 ENvTL. POL. 189, 202-04 (2006)
(describing the new responsibility system ordered by the State Council for
environmental protection, and the way in which it trickled down to provincial
and municipal governments in the late 1990's); Dan Guttman & Yaqin Song,
Making Central-Local Relations Work: Comparing America and China Environmental
Governance Systems, 1 FRONTIERS OF ENVTL. Sci. & ENG'G IN CHINA 418, 429-30
(2007) (describing the target system as it interacts with Chinese environmental
law). These systems differ in their details and implementation. Guttman and
Song note that in the Pudong district of Shanghai, local environmental protection
bureaus ("EPBs") each bear responsibility for drafting environmental targets. The
Shanghai government subsequently incorporates these standards in their
evaluations of other municipal agencies, such as transportation authorities. In
contrast, Nanjing municipal authorities directly require the head of the local EPB
to bear responsibility for ensuring that the jurisdiction meets environmental
standards. To accomplish this, local EPB authorities enter into target
responsibility arrangements with polluters, which may include private actors. Id.
47 See Hebei sheng jiaotong ting anquan shengchan mubiao guanli kaohe
banfa [Hebei Provincial Traffic Department Target Safety Production
Management and Evaluation System], issued Jan. 2006 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Heibei
System] (setting forth the relevant Hebei responsibility system).
48 Id. arts. 5(3), 7(1). In the event of an accidental killing of three to nine
people, a bureau that has "failed to carry out safe production" duties loses 20
points, while a bureau "directly in charge of supervising" the location or subject
involved in the accident loses 10 points. Id.
49 Id. arts. 5(4), 6.
50 Id. arts. 3(1)1, 7(1). Chinese officials also adopt standalone responsibility
systems that specify sanctions for particular outcomes, such as the occurrence of
citizen petitions to higher levels of the bureaucracy. See, e.g., Jinchang shi xinfang
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Officials in the state-run media adopt similar systems for print
and Internet publications. For example, in 2005, the editors of one
of China's leading publications, the China Youth Daily, drafted a
new internal appraisal system for journalists' articles. Journalists
received points, linked to salary rewards, depending on the results
of their work. Authors of the top three most frequently read
articles in each month's reader survey each received fifty points.
Journalists also received points if their articles received official
praise-100 points if singled out by national government or
provincial Party authorities, 300 points if singled out by central
Politburo officials. Editors received 30% of the points generated by
the journalists they supervised. Criticism of journalists by name
resulted in corresponding losses of points.51 The China Youth
Daily's point system received national attention when one of its
editors publicly distributed a memo that revealed details of the
appraisal system and criticized it for limiting free speech. The
paper's leaders subsequently announced their intention to
abandon the appraisal system.5 2 But similar evaluation systems
continue to be available on the websites of local Party propaganda
bureaus.53
Responsibility systems employed by administrative agencies
adopt liability principles paralleling those seen in Party systems.
In systems such as the Hebei one above, the key trigger for
sanctions is the specified occurrence -death of a specified number
of people, a particular number of accidents, or the fact that an
gongzuo zeren zhuijiu zhidu [Jinchang Municipal Xinfang Responsibility System],
issued Nov. 9, 2006 (P.R.C.), available at http://zfb.jc.gansu.gov.cn/showart.asp
?id=103&showpage=l.
51 See EastSouthWestNorth, The Letter of Li Datong,
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050817_2.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009)
(criticizing the appraisal system advanced by Party authorities to establish a
numerical evaluation system for journalists' articles, with evaluations linked to a
series of financial rewards and sanctions).
52 See Robert Marquand, Chinese Media Resisting Party Control, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 26, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com
/2005/0826/p01s04-woap.html (reporting on the widespread practices
exemplified by the China Youth Daily incident).
53 See, e.g., Zhonggong Tengzhou shiwei xuanchuanbu guanyu xinwen
xuanchuan kaohe jiangli de shishi yijian [Opinion of the CCP Tengzhou
Municipality Propaganda Bureau Regarding Implementation of the News
Propaganda Evaluation and Reward System], issued Jan. 28, 2008 (P.R.C.),
available at http://tzwmw.tengzhou.gov.cn/ggl/t20090205_64761.htm (outlining
the news evaluation and reward system for Tengzhou municipality, including
rewards for reporting positive news).
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accident created a "serious domestic impact." This is a strict
liability standard -it is independent of the fault or mental state of
any of the state employees in question. Collective and vicarious
sanctions are employed as well. In one example from a state-
owned media outlet, all employees in a particular bureau lost their
annual bonuses (of several thousand yuan apiece) as a result of a
single employee being detained on prostitution charges that
"negatively impacted" the bureau's image.54
Chinese courts also adopt responsibility systems.55 Targets
vary under these systems. Some targets reflect routine
management concerns. Judges can lose points for extensive
absences or poor courtroom behavior. Other targets reflect Party
political interests. For example, tribunals and judges can receive
(or lose) points depending on whether they have held the proper
number of conferences on Party theory or produced the requisite
number of propaganda articles.5 6 Still other targets are directly
linked to judicial performance in handling cases. Judges face
annual target ratios for mediation,5 7 case closure,5 8 and appellate
54 Interview with Chinese official, in Beijing China (on file with author).
55 See Ai Jiahui, Zhongguo fayuan jixiao kaoping zhidu yanjiu [Research On
Chinese Court Performance Evaluation Systems], 83 LAW & Soc. DEV. 70 (2008)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of Chinese court systems).
56 See generally Minzner, supra note 20 (explaining the various methods by
which internal disciplinary systems at local Chinese courts work). Still other
systems sanction judges for numerical, grammatical, or spelling errors in their
judgments. Hebei 75 ming shenpanyuan yin xiaci an shou zhuijiu [75 Hebei Judges
Sanctioned for Errors in Their Cases], YANZHAO DUSHI BAO [YANZHAO METROPOLITAN
DAILY], Dec. 3, 2008, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-03
/020216770609.shtml.
57 See, e.g., Du Xichen, Shi fayuan minshang anjian tiaojie lIi da 70.6%
[Commercial Tribunal Municipal Court Mediation Rate Reaches 70.6%], Linghai
Government Website, http://www.lnlh.gov.cn/news/news.asp?id=107 (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.) (noting that the court responsibility system requires
each tribunal to reach a target of 70 percent of mediated cases, in conjunction with
an effort to reduce citizen petitioning -i.e. shangfang-and that individual
tribunals are docked or awarded points depending on whether they reach or
exceed the target ratio).
58 See, e.g., Tonghai xian renmin fayuan gangwei mubiao guanli zeren zhi
ban'an jiangcheng kaohe banfa [Tonghai County People's Court Reward and
Punishment System for Target Goals], issued Nov. 25, 2002, art. 2(2)(2)(1) (P.R.C.),
available at http://fy.tonghai.gov.cn/news.asp?id=88 [hereinafter Tonghai
Measures] (setting annual case closure targets ranging from 70 to 98% for different
tribunals).
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reversal.5 9 Thus, for example, individual Chinese judges and
tribunals may face expectations that they close 100% of criminal
cases in a given year, successfully mediate 80% of civil cases, or
have no more than 2% of their cases reversed on appeal. Other
numerical targets include: enforcement ratios, average numbers of
cases handled by individual judges, and numbers of citizen
petitions (shangfang) to higher-level Party or government
authorities generated by citizen discontent with court decisions.60
Chinese court responsibility systems also employ liability
principles that parallel those found in their administrative and
Party counterparts. Court presidents and tribunal heads bear
vicarious responsibility -and receive corresponding sanctions or
rewards -for ensuring that their subordinates make target.61
Some systems apply collective sanctions. Under such systems,
judges receive financial penalties (or bonuses) for the failure (or
success) of their tribunals to make target.62 Last, some local court
responsibility systems apply strict liability principles to sanction
judges. For example, some local court systems automatically
sanction judges or tribunals for any case reversed on appeal, even
if the reversal was for simple legal error arising from
59 See Minzner, supra note 20, at 69-73 (explaining the types of liability that
judges can receive as a result of negative appellate review or reversals of their
decisions).
60 See Fujian sheng gaoji renmin fayuan yanjiu shi [Research Department of
the Fujian HPC], Fujian fayuan shenpan yeji pinggu tixi de goujian he yingyong
[Creation and Application of an Evaluation System for the Trial Work of Fujian Courts],
RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICIARY J.], Dec. 2006, at 41 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Fujian
Evaluation System] (describing targets used on a province-wide basis by the
Fujian High People's Court).
61 See Gaocheng shi renmin fayuan gongzuo mubiao guanli kaohe jiangli
banfa shishi xize [Gaocheng Municipal People's Court Implementation Details for
the Management of the Work Target Assessments and Rewards], issued Aug. 14,
2002, art. 22(1) (P.R.C.), available at http://gcsfy.chinacourt.org/public/
detail.php?id=64; Zhenping xian renmin fayuan 2006 nian gangwei mubiao
zerenzhi ji kaopfng banfa (shixing) [Zhenping County People's Court 2006
Responsibility System and Assessment Measures (Provisional)], issued Feb. 15,
2006, art. 5(a) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Zhenping System]; Guanghan fayuan 2004
niandu gangwei mubiao guanli kaohe banfa [Guanghan Court 2004 Evaluation
System for the Management of Annual Work Targets], issued May 17, 2004, art. 24
(P.R.C.), available at http://ghfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=285; See also
Zhou Jianhao, Renmin fayuan cuo'an zeren zhuijiuzhi xin shijiao [New Look at
Responsibility Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases], NAT'L JUDGES C.L.J. (P.R.C.)
52, 54 (2003) (noting the problems generated by responsibility system that apply
vicarious liability to tribunal heads for errors of judges).
62 See Minzner, supra note 20, at 63 (analyzing Chinese court responsibility
systems used to evaluate and discipline judges).
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fundamentally unclear laws or regulations, rather than any failing
of the judge himself. 63
The above discussion is simply the tip of the iceberg. Chinese
authorities use responsibility arrangements based on similar
principles to create incentives for a wide range of actors, including
non-state ones. Heads of village committees, not technically part
of the Chinese government apparatus, commonly sign
responsibility contracts with township officials linking their
success in meeting particular governance targets to concrete
financial bonuses.64 As part of the campaign to maintain social
order for the 2008 Olympics, urban residents' committees
compelled individual businesses throughout Beijing to sign
responsibility arrangements and assume liability for any activities
of their employees that disrupted social order.65 A range of local
authorities have experimented with similar systems holding
employers or landlords vicariously responsible for infractions by
their migrant workers or residents, such as failure to comply with
birth control policies.66
2.3. Functions
Responsibility systems play critical institutional roles in the
Chinese political and legal system. They are tools that central
authorities can use to push local officials to address particular
issues of concern. They are transmission belts by which vague
central legal and administrative norms are operationalized into
meaningful directives for local authorities to carry out. And they
are top-down monitoring devices that assist central authorities in
addressing pervasive principal-agent problems in the Chinese
bureaucracy.
63 Id.
64 YANG ZHONG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CHINA: CHALLENGES
FROM BELOW 140-41 (2003).
65 Xin Jing Bao, 29 wan zhi'an zhiyuanzhe xunfang jingcheng [290,000 Public
Order Volunteers Patrol Beijing], BEIJING NEWS, July 31, 2008, available at
http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/olympic/2008/07-31/018@082041.htm.
66 See, e.g., Wang Congrui, Zhongmei sanjian sanshi gongcheng chu quanfangwei
luoshi jihua shengyu guanli fuwu gongzuo zerenzhi [Zhongmei Third Construction
Group, NO. 30 Engineering Unit Fully Implements Birth Control Management Work
Responsibility System], Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://ldrk.ahpfpc.gov.cn
/page.php?fp=newsdetail&id=11708 (describing the implementation of family
planning policies in a particular work unit).
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First, higher-level authorities can use responsibility systems as
a rudder to steer lower levels of the bureaucracy. As Chinese
scholars themselves note, the combination of work targets,
significant career and financial rewards and sanctions, and
vicarious and collective liability for leaders and units, create a
"pressurized system."67 "Making target" (or at least appearing to
do so) is all-important for local officials. Higher-level Chinese
authorities can consequently pressure local authorities to devote
more or less attention to particular target areas through their
choice of responsibility targets. Unsurprisingly, central authorities
consistently prioritize targets (such as birth control statistics) that
are associated with core, long-term national policies (such as
population planning).
Higher authorities can also use responsibility targets as an
electric cattle prod to jolt the bureaucratic apparatus into
addressing pressing short-term tasks. During the 2008 Beijing
Olympics, for example, central authorities faced the need to
maintain stability and uphold China's external image in the face of
international attention. They responded with a sweeping
campaign setting severe career sanctions for any local Party or
government officials whose actions led to outbreaks of protests or
mass petitions. 68
Authorities continually tinker with targets depending on
practical need or prevailing political winds.69 In 2002-2003, China
67 Tony Saich, The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analysing the Local State in
China, in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: CONFLICTS, GROWTH AND CRISIS 75, 94 (Luigi
Tomba ed., 2002).
68 Chris Buckley, China Announces Olympics Stability Drive After Riot, REUTERS,
June 30, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis
/idUSPEK40331; Guanyu weifan xinfang gongzuo jilti chufen zanxing guiding
[Temporary Decision Regarding Sanctions for Disciplinary Violations of Letters
and Visits Work], (promulgated by the Cent. Party Discipline Comm., effective
July 24, 2008) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-07/24
/content_1054991.htm (setting out disciplinary sanctions for officials whose
actions generate mass petitions); Weifan xinfang gongzuo jili shiyong dangji chufen
tiaoli ruogan wenti jieshi [Interpretation of Relevant Questions Regarding the Application
of Party Disciplinary Sanctions for Violations of Disciplinary Violations of Letters and
Visits Work], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 24, 2008, available at
http:/ /news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/24/content_8762985.htm
(explaining Party disciplinary sanctions for Party members whose actions
generate citizen petitions).
69 See Whiting, supra note 10, at 114-15 (discussing how Chinese authorities
changed tax and finance targets in the wake of negative experiences with earlier
targets).
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experienced a leadership transition when Hu Jintao assumed office
as head of the Chinese Party and state. Both Hu and his premier,
Wen Jiabao, sought to alter the course of the Chinese bureaucracy.
They wanted to reduce the emphasis on economic development set
by their predecessors, and focus attention on a broader range of
social and environmental issues. Noting that the "mild
environment management and legal measures [used] in the past
have proved to be ineffective" to combat increasing environmental
damage,70 deputy director of the State Environmental Protection
Agency Pan Yue and other Chinese reformers promoted efforts to
directly affect the calculations of local officials by adjusting
personnel evaluation and responsibility systems. In particular,
they supported the development of new responsibility targets for
issues such as environmental protection. 71 Since 2004, Chinese
authorities have experimented with adopting the concept of
"Green GDP" into the cadre evaluation process. By adopting
environmentally-adjusted measures of economic growth as the
basis for local cadre performance, reformers hope to counteract
incentives for local officials to grant approval to illegal and
environmentally hazardous projects simply to improve their
economic development scores. 72
Similar tinkering occurs within the legal system. In the last
several years, central court authorities have altered their emphasis
regarding the work of the Chinese judiciary. They have sought to
encourage local courts to dispose of cases through mediation,
rather than trial. 73 Shifting responsibility targets has been a critical
70 Green GDP to be Expanded Nationally, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 18, 2007, available at
http://wwwl.china.org.cn/english/China/196436.htm.
71 Zhao Xiaohui, Wei Wu, Zhongguo dui pianmian zhuiqiu GDP zengzhang shuo
bu fazhan mubiao yirenweiben [China Says No to Single-Minded Pursuit of Economic
Development, Development Targets to Take People as Their Core], SINA NEWS, Mar. 4,
2004, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-03-04/03522991070.shtml
(discussing the shift in emphasis in responsibility systems away from economic
growth); Carlos Lo & Shui-yan Tang, Institutional Reform: Economic Changes, and
Local Environmental Management in China, 15 ENvTL. POL. 189, 202-04 (2006)
(examining local environmental bureau efforts to introduce new environmental
responsibility systems).
72 Baohu huanjing jiu shi zhengji zhongguo yao yong lise GDP [Protecting the
Environment is an Official [Target] Achievement, China Will Use Green GDP to
Evaluate Local Officials], XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Mar. 8, 2008, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/08/content_1351140.htm.
73 See Benjamin L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical
Legacies and Legal Reform 22-25 (Mar. 31, 2009) (unpublished paper, on file with
author) (discussing the increased recent emphasis by Chinese courts on
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tool in this endeavor. Court officials have ramped up the
importance of numerical rates of cases closed through mediation in
systems for evaluating local courts and judges. They have required
regular public disclosure of mediation statistics. And they have
awarded titles such as "Pace-Setting Mediator" to high-performing
judges, along with resulting financial rewards, in an effort to
stimulate competition between judges to outperform each other in
their mediation efforts.74
Second, responsibility targets play a critical functional role in
interpreting and "operationalizing" abstract central norms.
Following the issuance of a broad directive by national authorities
(such as the 2004 central directive to improve Party governance),
there is a "cascade" effect as it is transmitted level-by-level down
through the bureaucratic hierarchy. Lower-level authorities
progressively flesh out the vague language of the central orders
with increasing detail and instructions as to how to implement
them.75 Responsibility systems are a crucial link in this process.
mediation); Fayuan gao tiaojie jiean Iv beihou de yinyou [Concerns Behind Courts High
Rates of Case Closure Through Mediation], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], June 11, 2009,
available at http:/ /www.legaldaily.com.cn/0801/2009-06/11/content
_1104238.htm (examining the positive and negative effects of the increased
emphasis on mediation).
74 Duoyuan tiaojie jianxiao Anhui minshangshi an tiaojielv 3 nian you 28% shang
sheng dao 50% [Diverse Mediation (System) Proves Effective, Mediation Rates for Civil
Commercial Cases in Anhui (Province) Increase From 28% to 50% in Three Years],
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], May 4, 2009, available at
http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/zfdt/2009-05/04/content_72640.htm (discussing
relevant measures taken in Anhui province to promote mediation).
75 For an example of this process, see Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang
dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding [Central Party Committee Decision Regarding
Strengthening Party Governance Capacity], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 19, 2004,
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-09/26/content
_2024232.htm (broad national Central Party directive instructing local officials to
strengthen Party governance, respond to citizen discontent, address official errors,
and adopt responsibility systems); Huludao City Working Committee,
Zhonggong Fujian shengwei guanche "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang
dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding" de shishi yijian [Fujian Communist
Party Provincial Party Committee Implementation Opinion Regarding The
"Central Party Committee Decision Regarding Strengthening Party Governance
Capacity], issued 2004, art. 4(4) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.hldjgdj.gov.cn
/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1149 (Fjian provincial Party committee
directive calling for carrying out the central directive, fleshing out the aims of the
central orders by adding additional content, and calling for the use of
responsibility systems to operationalize these orders); Shennongjia Lin District
Party Committee, Zhonggong shennongjia lin qu weiyuanhui guanyu xuexi
guanche "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli
jianshe de jueding" de yijian [Shennongjia Lin District Party Committee
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They translate abstract norms into more concrete targets that have
meaning for lower level officials who have to implement them.
They include critical details such as timetables, numerical
evaluation standards, and specific delegations of responsibility to
particular bureaus for ensuring that targets are met.76
Legal norms experience this process of translation as well. The
2002 Law on Safe Production, for example, sets out a range of
broad national goals. These include production safety standards,
the rights of workers to a safe workplace, and institutional
channels for supervising these goals.77 As this mandate percolated
down through the bureaucracy, provincial and county authorities
fleshed it out with target goals and punishments incorporated into
target responsibility systems facing relevant authorities. 78 Vague
Implementation Opinion Regarding Studying And Carrying Out The "Central
Party Committee Decision Regarding Strengthening Party Governance
Capacity"], issued 2004 (P.R.C.), available at http://mslt.snj.gov.cn/snjxx
/main/snjnews/2005/010502.htm (local Party committee directive calling for the
implementation of the national and provincial directives, adding content not
specifically referenced in the national directive, such as strengthening local
judicial responsibility systems for incorrectly decided cases). See also Zhonggong
pingliang shiwei guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang yifa zhi shi gongzuo de yijian
[Pingliang Municipal Communist Party Committee Opinion Regarding
Strengthening the Work of Managing the City According to Law], issued Aug. 9,
2005, art. 2(3) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.pingliang.gov.cn/
PingLiangWebSite/PartyCommitee/FilesDetail.jsp?organ id=2&docid=1341.
Similar implementation processes occur in the wake of any broad central Party
policy initiative. See, e.g., Chinese President Urges Implementation of Anti-Corruption
Responsibility System, SINA NEws, Oct. 21, 2008, available at http://english.sina.com
/china/2008/1020/192928.html (calling for local authorities to create anti-
corruption responsibility systems to carry out a central campaign).
76 See, e.g., Party Organization Bureau of Kaiping Municipality, Guanyu
Kaiping shi dangzheng jiguan he hangye zuofeng jianshe kaohe shishi yijian
[Opinion Regarding Implementation The Evaluation of Kaiping Municipal Party
and Government Organ Work], issued 2004, available at http://zzb.kaiping.gov.cn
/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=450 (setting forth specific assessment responsibilities
and guidelines for government bureaus).
77 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo anquan shengchan fa [Law on Safe
Production] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29,
2002, effective Nov. 1, 2002) 2002 STANDING COMM. NATL PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ.
(P.R.C.), arts. 16-67, available at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-08/05
/contenL20950.htm.
78 Id. See also Hunan sheng anquan shengchan tiaoli [Hunan Regulations on
Safe Production], issued Sept. 28, 2004 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.law-lib
.com/law/law-view.asp?id=87745 (discussing sanctions for violations of the
Regulations on Safe Production); Yongshun xian renmin zhengfu ban'gongshi
guanyu yinfa 2006 nian anquan shengchan zeren mubiao guanli kaohe banfa de
tongzhi [Notice of the General Office of the Yongshun County People's
Government Regarding the Issuance of the 2006 Evaluation Measures for the Safe
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language regarding the rights of trade unions and workers to
participate in the oversight of work safety disappeared. In its
place: numerical target goals capable of being measured. County-
level systems established 100-point scales for grading officials on
production safety. These set out targets for "safe production" legal
propaganda events that local officials were expected to carry out.
They delineated permissible numbers and scale of work accidents
that were allowed to occur. And they specified the corresponding
personnel sanctions for bureaus and officers who failed to reach
these target goals, such as requiring the immediate resignation of
relevant officials whose jurisdictions experienced accidents
resulting in more than 10 deaths.79 Through this process, the
relatively vague content of central laws was translated into
meaningful operational instructions for front-line local county and
township authorities, and cast in terms of strict, collective, and
vicarious liability linked to specific target goals.
Third, responsibility systems are a core tool for central
authorities to address severe principal-agent problems. This may
seem counterintuitive at first glance. Influenced by news photos of
public security forces rounding up dissidents, outsiders often view
the Chinese state as an all-powerful authoritarian monolith. Many
assume that Chinese central authorities are able to assert their will
throughout the system at all times. But central authorities actually
Production Target Responsibility System], issued Feb. 9, 2006 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.ysx.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticlelD=2902 (laying out
safe production evaluation standards in Yongshun County). For examples of
similar processes of translating legal norms into concrete targets, see Shengchan
anquan shigu baogao he diaocha chuli tiaoli [Regulations on Reporting,
Investigating, and Handling Safety Production Accidents], issued April 9, 2007
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/19/content_588577.htm;
Tongzhou shi anquan shengchan mubiao kaohe xize [Details for the Tongzhou
Municipal Safe Production Target Evaluation System], issued Oct. 26, 2007
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.tz.gov.cn/tzdz/UploadFile
//200711060903491450.doc.
79 Under the Yongshun county system, for example, officials who experience
a production accident resulting in one to two deaths lose their ability to be
selected as "outstanding" that year. Accidents resulting in from three to nine
deaths result in the loss of officials' ability to be re-nominated for their position,
while accidents resulting in more than ten deaths require the immediate
resignation of the relevant official. Yongshun xian renmin zhengfu ban'gongshi
guanyu yinfa 2006 nian anquan shengchan zeren mubiao guanli kaohe banfa de
tongzhi [Notice of the General Office of the Yongshun County People's
Government Regarding the Issuance of the 2006 Evaluation Measures for the Safe
Production Target Responsibility System], issued Feb. 9, 2006, art. 8 (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.ysx.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticlelD=2902.
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face extreme difficulties in regularly imposing their will on their
local agents.80 They lack the time and energy to comprehensively
monitor local agents' work around the clock. They also lack
reliable and independent channels of information to do so. The
centralized control enjoyed by a few local Party authorities over
local governments, legislatures, courts, and media outlets, means
that they can choke off negative information to Beijing that reflects
poorly on their performance. Following a large industrial accident
that caused a massive benzene leak on the Songhua River in
November 2005, for example, Jilin provincial officials simply
barred any reporting on the incident for over a week, blinding
central authorities as to the extent of the crisis.81
Naturally, central Party authorities attempt to defeat such
concealment. As with their imperial predecessors, they use direct
observation as one tactic. High-level Chinese authorities conduct
regular inspection tours to see how central policies are being
carried out. These are often cloaked in secrecy to prevent local
officials from learning in advance which areas will be investigated.
Zhao Shukai, a State Council researcher, notes cases in which
provincial-level birth control inspection teams do not know their
destinations when they set off on survey inspections. Rather, they
are given three letters. The first, to be opened upon departure, tells
them which county they are to proceed to. The second, to be
opened on arrival in the designated county, tells them which
township to inspect. The last, to be opened upon arrival in the
township, specifically instructs them which villages to survey.
This theoretically limits the ability of local officials to conceal facts
on the ground (for example, by temporarily hiding unregistered
80 Kevin J. O'Brien, Neither Transgressive Nor Contained: Boundary-Spanning
Contention in China, 8 MOBILIZATION 51, 60 (2003) (explaining problems
confronted by central authorities seeking to monitor subordinates); Murray Scot
Tanner & Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over
Policing and Obstacles to "Rule of Law" in China, 191 CHINA Q., 644, 646-47 (2007)
(discussing difficulties encountered by central authorities in monitoring local
public security officials).
81 Kim Hunter Gordon, Ssh, Don't Mention it to the Emperor, GUARDIAN, Dec.
4, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/dec/04
/business.china. The incident led to an international incident with Russia, and
generated panic among the residents of the provincial capital denied accurate
information as to why their municipal water system had been shut off.
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children), or engaging in advance collusion with the inspection
teams (for example, by bribing them).82
But local officials can defeat even these controls. As one
township official noted:
Actually, [these surprise inspections] can be circumvented;
it just requires the use of calculation and manpower. First,
regardless of how secretive preparations for the inspection
are, we are always able to figure out when [the inspection
team] enters our [prefecture], because we have contacts in
the provincial government. We even know their license
plate number. Second, once they have entered our
[prefecture], things are easier to handle. Relevant bureaus
from the prefecture and each county monitor the inspection
teams. [We] even know what restaurant they ate at, what
they ate, and what time they left the following day. Third,
along their route, county and township authorities set up
observers. We can establish where the [inspectors] are
going and where they stop. Fourth, once we determine
their trail, it is easy for us to determine what days they are
likely to enter our township. That way, we can warn in
advance those villages that are in the scope of the
sample... and allow those families with children in excess
of the birth quotas to hide themselves. In this manner, we
generally manage to pass these inspections without
incident.83
Other scholars reach similar conclusions. In a comprehensive
2007 study of central-local police relations, Green and Tanner
surveyed the wide formal powers that central Chinese authorities
possess for monitoring and controlling their local agents, such as
82 Zhao Shukai, Xiangzhen zhengfu de yingchou shenghuo [The Life of
Entertaining (Higher Level Officials) in Township Government], in 2006 ZHONG GUO
FAZHAN YANJIU-GUOWUYUAN FAZHAN JANJIU ZHONGXIU GAO GAOXUAN [2006
CHINA DEVELOPMENT STUDIES- STATE COUNCIL'S DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL]
247 (Ma Hong & Wang Mengkui eds., 2006).
83 Id. at 247-48. Setting up Potemkin villages is another option. Examples of
local Chinese officials misleading central inspection teams or high-ranking visitors
through such tactics are legion. See CHEN GUIDI & WU CHUNTAO, AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONDITION OF THE CHINESE PEASANTRY, translated at
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/200402284.htm (providing a 1998 example of one
such effort by Anhui officials to mislead visiting premier Zhu Rongji as to the
success of local grain policies).
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issuing central laws and policies and setting personnel quotas. But
they conclude that these mechanisms:
[do] not translate into detailed, effective control over local
police behaviour. The powers in the hands of local party-
state leaders -leadership authority, hiring of regular
officers, leading cadre management, finance and budgeting,
and setting salaries -still loom much larger .... [I]n this
cornerstone sector of state power-legal coercion-the
levers of central control over provinces and localities are
relatively weak, and very shallow in their reach!"4
Bottom-up monitoring is another strategy employed by central
authorities. 8 Since 1978, Chinese authorities have turned away
from fiery Maoist-style political campaigns as a means of stirring
up the populace and checking the behavior of local officials. But
central authorities have created a range of systems that harness
limited bottom-up citizen participation to assist in the
administrative monitoring of local authorities. Some date back to
the creation of the PRC, or earlier. Examples include the state
media and xinfang (letters and visits) system as locales for citizens
to present their grievances to higher authorities regarding local
abuses.8 6 Others are newer. Over the last 30 years, Chinese
authorities have experimented with creating legal and electoral
channels for citizens to contest the actions of local authorities.
Examples include the Administrative Litigation Law (allowing
citizens a limited right to sue government officials) and the
Organic Law on Villagers Committees (authorizing elections for
village committees),87 As each of these channels has opened up,
84 Tanner & Green, supra note 80, at 668-69.
85 Jing Vivian Zhan, Decentralizing China: Analysis of Central Strategies in
China's Fiscal Reforms, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 445, 449-51 (2009) (discussing bottom-
up reporting and the problems associated with it).
86 See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in
the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005) (analyzing the role of media
in the Chinese legal system); Minzner, supra note 8 (analyzing the xinfang system).
87 Nathan has termed these "input institutions." Andrew J. Nathan,
Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6, 14-15 (2003) (defining input
institutions as institutions that citizens can use to apprise the state of their
concerns).
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Chinese citizens have indeed actively used them to seek redress of
their grievances and expose misbehavior of local authorities.88
But central reliance on bottom-up monitoring also carries risks.
As discussed in greater detail below, as each of these channels has
opened up, citizen use of them has gone beyond what central
authorities are comfortable with. Both electoral and legal reforms
have permitted the emergence of a cadre of activists who use them
not only to challenge the bad behavior of individual local officials,
but also to bring a wider range of politicized grievances that
implicate local (or even national) policies. From the standpoint of
central authorities implacably committed to maintaining Party
control, these represent worrying trends that must be closely
controlled and, if necessary, suppressed.89
So if direct monitoring is limited in its effectiveness, and
bottom-up monitoring is dangerous in practice, what to do?
Faced with this dilemma, responsibility systems are a logical
governance choice. Take the use of numerical targets. Broad
instructions to local authorities such as "take reasonable economic
measures to improve product safety" or "strengthen
environmental protection" are simply too difficult for central
authorities to check up on. They disappear in the ocean of local
Chinese governance, leaving not a ripple behind. In contrast,
easily quantifiable work statistics (numbers of mine explosions,
petitioners in Beijing, judicial cases reversed, GDP statistics) have a
natural appeal for administrators.90 They are simple and direct.
They at least offer some concrete targets for higher officials to
evaluate and grade, in contrast to entirely qualitative reports from
local authorities. Numerical targets also allow higher officials to
draw comparisons across jurisdictions to ferret out outliers or low
performers. 91  This partially helps address the problem of
subjective self-reporting (or, lying) by local authorities.
88 See Kevin J. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, The Politics of Lodging Complaints in
Rural China, 143 CHINA Q. 756 (1995) (describing these channels and citizens' use
of them).
89 See infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
90 Interview, Shanghai Intermediate People's Court judge, in Shanghai, China
(on file with author).
91 Fujian High People's Court officials make this point in their discussion of
their provincial system. See Fujian Evaluation System, supra note 60, at 42.
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Naturally, this is only a partial solution. Local authorities
manipulate numerical statistics as well.92 For example, according
to Tsai's survey of 316 villages, 81% of village officials admitted
falsifying income data reported to higher officials (with an average
discrepancy between real and reported income of 44%!).93 This
creates a problem. How do you evaluate the performance of your
subordinates when they can alter the very data you have to rely on
to conduct your evaluation?
One possibility is to rely on criteria that are more difficult to
fudge.94 Local officials certainly can find ways to pretend to be in
compliance with targets such as "no mine explosions killing more
than 10 people" or "generate investment of at least 1 million yuan
into your county over the next six months." Mine disasters can be
covered up; investment figures can be altered. But doing so
requires hiding bodies, forging bank records, and paying off the
relevant people. It is certainly more difficult than simply lying
about one's own performance in a qualitative report ("Yet another
outstanding year again, boss") or altering statistics that are entirely
within the control of local officials (number of work conferences
held). This added level of difficulty is precisely why particular
numerical targets linked to harder-to-conceal events are attractive
to central authorities seeking to monitor their subordinates.
Even better, from the perspective of higher authorities, are
targets that they can directly observe themselves, without relying
on reporting by local officials. Numbers of cases reversed on
appeal may be a crude proxy for the efficiency of lower-level
courts and the numbers of disgruntled petitioners from a particular
jurisdiction who show up outside central government offices in
Beijing may be a flawed tool for assessing the work of Party
officials in that jurisdiction. But in the upper altitudes of a
centralized bureaucracy starved for accurate tools to assess the
performance of its local agents, both types of targets have a critical
advantage over others. Higher-level authorities can look in their
92 Zhan, supra note 85, at 449 (explaining that because data reported by local
authorities is used for performance evaluation, incentives exist for local
authorities to exaggerate achievements).
93 Lily Tsai, The Falsification of Village Income Statistics, 196 CHINA Q. 805, 809
(2008).
94 Landry, supra note 41, at 202-06.
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own files (or out their windows) and actually collect the
information themselves.95
Higher-level authorities' use of strict, collective, and vicarious
liability can be understood in the same light. These are
institutional responses to pervasive informational gaps and
principal-agent problems in the Chinese bureaucracy. Take strict
liability. Establishing why local authorities failed to meet
designated work targets requires higher officials to make difficult
assessments as to the veracity of local officials' claims ("We really
tried to meet the birth control targets, boss, but there was this
thing.. ."). Establishing specifically who should bear responsibility
for failures poses similar problems ("The string of recent mine
explosions isn't my fault, boss-it's Xiao Zhang's"). Evaluating
these claims requires access to information under the control of
local officials -information that can be difficult or impossible for
central officials to obtain. Strict liability resolves these problems by
limiting the need for central authorities to engage in complex fault-
based analyses. It allows higher officials to simply disburse
sanctions (or rewards) based on the failure (or success) of local
officials to reach the specified goal.
Vicarious liability is attractive for the same reason. Higher-
level Chinese authorities simply don't have the time, energy, or
resources to investigate each time a Party committee, government
bureau, imperial magistrate, or group of yamen runners fails to
meet a target. Requiring the head of the unit to bear vicarious
liability for the failure is an administratively direct and simple
resolution to this problem. It offloads the responsibility for
monitoring subordinate employees, and for figuring out how to
actually reach the set target, on individual Party, government, and
unit leaders. Moreover, it makes sense - after all, the relevant
Party leader exercises sweeping authority over bureau operations.
Why not tag him or her with responsibilities for all of its failures?
Collective responsibility provides similar advantages. As two
Henan basic-level court officials noted in touting their
responsibility system, "[t]ightly linking the interests of the work
unit and the interests of the individual makes efforts aimed at
95 This may be a crucial reason why reform of the "letters and visits" (xinfang)
petitioning system is so institutionally difficult in China. Higher-level Chinese
authorities are dependent -perhaps addicted-to the stream of both qualitative
and quantitative information that the xinfang system brings to them regarding
what is taking place at the local levels in their own country.
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fulfilling the targets the conscious action of every [court] officer." 96
Tying the personal economic interests of individual officials to the
success or failure of their colleagues (or their unit as a whole)
encourages them to watch (or assist) each other in "making target."
This reduces the need for central authorities to individually
monitor particular subordinates.
Top-down responsibility systems fulfill another important
political function as well. They ensure that local officials remain
dependent on satisfying higher-level mandates for their career
advancement and legitimacy, rather than on cultivating a populist
following among residents in their jurisdictions. Individual local
officials occasionally pursue such strategies. 97  These pose
problems for centralized one-Party control, because they create the
spectre that a local leader may build up political legitimacy
independent of the Party's own organization, fracturing the
system.
For precisely this reason, central Party authorities remain
extremely leery of allowing bottom-up monitoring principles to
penetrate the cadre evaluation process. Since the late 1990s, Party
authorities have allowed limited local experiments that include
popular opinion as a component of selecting and evaluating Party
and government cadres.98 But they have severely cabined these
efforts. Party regulations allow citizens only a small role in
nominating potential candidates for positions. They charge higher-
96 Su Jiacheng & Wang Lishen, Shuzi hua fayuan guanli moshi de changshi [An
Experiment in Numerical Court Management], 11 PEOPLE'S JUSTICE 51 (2006)
97 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Electoral Reforms in
Sichuan Aid Populist Local Official, 21ST CENUTRY Bus. HERALD, Oct. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle
=2672 (providing an example of populist strategies employed in Sichuan).
98 Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo zanxing tiaoli,
[Temporary Regulations on the Selection of Leading Party and Government
Cadres], issued Feb. 9, 1995, arts. 10(6), 15 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/177918.htm; Dang zheng lingdao
ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli, [Regulations on the Selection of Leading
Party and Government Cadres], issued July 9, 2002, art. 12(6) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
2002 Selection Regulations], available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB
/shizheng/16/20020723/782504.html; see also Whiting, supra note 10, at 105
(noting that a 2000 State Council reform outline placed greater emphasis on both
professional competence and public opinion but without introducing any
meaningful democratization); Jiceng jianchayuan gongzuo lianghua guanli chuyi
[Humble Opinions on the Management of Work Evaluation of Basic-Level
Procuratorates] (promulgated by Jingmen City, Dongbao District, Basic-Level
Procuratorate, effective April 25, 2005), available at http://www.jingshan.jcy
.gov.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=477 (P.R.C.).
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level officials with exercising tight control over the candidate pool
and the actual selection process.99 And they further specify that a
candidate's popular support should not be allowed to become a
determinative factor in the selection process.100
2009 Yunnan draft provincial regulations provide one example
of such efforts.' 01 They govern the evaluations of key municipal
(prefectural-level) Party, government, and court officials. The draft
regulations set a range of work targets, including crime statistics,
tax revenue, and growth in per-capita GDP and rural incomes, 10 2
that account for 60% of officials' numerical evaluations. The
remaining 40% of the evaluation is split equally between the
results of a given official's "democratic evaluation" (minzhu ceping)
and "popular opinion survey" (minyi diaocha).10 3  But actual
popular participation is quite restricted. Opinions of current and
former Party and government officials dominate both processes.
"Democratic evaluation," for example, consists of surveying
current municipal Party committee members, key leaders in the
municipal people's congress, court, procuratorate, Party
disciplinary inspection committee, and subordinate county
governments, as well as municipal leaders who have retired within
the last three years.104
2.4. A Comparative Look
Chinese reliance on strict, vicarious, and collective liability to
govern is not cultural. Rather, it is an institutional response to
informational and principal-agent problems. Western legal
99 2002 Selection Regulations, arts. 13-17, 35-36.
100 Id. art. 17.
101 Yunnan sheng zhoushi dangzheng lingdao banzi he lingdao ganbu
zonghe kaohe pingjia shishi banfa (shixing) [zhengqiu yijian gao] [(Experimental)
Yunnan Provincial Implementing Measures for the Comprehensive Evaluation of
Leading Prefectural-Level Municipal Party and Government Cadres] (proposed
by the Kunming Municipal Personnel Bureau, Feb. 24, 2009), available at
http://rsj.km.gov.cn/ImNews/List.asp?Id=8596 (P.R.C.).
102 For a list of the types of targets, see id., attached forms 1-1, 1-2.
103 Id. art. 13.
104 The regulations do allow for soliciting the opinions of others "who should
be consulted" as part of a given official's "democratic evaluation." Id. art. 8(7).
But they provide that these numbers should generally not exceed 20% of those
who participate. The "popular opinion survey" provides for slightly broader
participation, specifying that individuals surveyed should include delegates from
municipal people's congresses, representatives from municipal Party congresses
and "popular representatives" (qunzong daibiao). Id. art. 9.
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systems rely on similar mechanisms to respond to similar
problems.105
Take strict liability. It is a classic institutional response to
monitoring problems caused by information gaps. American tort
law provides the obvious example. Historically, tort recovery for
injuries caused by product defects required proof of negligence-
demonstrating a particular failure of a duty of care toward the
injured party. But by the mid-20th century, industrial production
chains had become highly extended and complicated. An
individual consumer faced extreme difficulty establishing exactly
which (and whose) behavior in the production process was the
cause of the exploding toaster that resulted in her injury.
Confronted with this information gap, American courts altered the
law, adopting a strict liability standard in product liability cases.
This eliminated the need for individual consumers to prove fault
on the part of the manufacturer. And it placed the responsibility to
monitor and avoid such defects on the manufacturer, identifying
him as best positioned to decide how to do so.106
Similarly, Western legal systems, both historical and modern,
rely on collective and vicarious sanctions to respond to principal-
agent problems. Under the medieval English system of
frankpledge, for example, adult males were organized into groups
of ten and held collectively liable for crimes of their members.10 7
Collective liability also applied in the economic sphere. An
English merchant from town A conducting trade in town B could
be held accountable by residents of B for debts previously incurred
105 For a comprehensive and excellent exploration of these issues, see Daryl J.
Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345 (2003). Naturally, reliance on
performance targets to manage sprawling bureaucracies is also not unique to
China. The U.S. Government Performance Results Act of 1993 requires federal
executive agencies to establish strategic plans and performance measures in
annual planning and reporting to "improve the confidence of the American
people in the capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding
Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results." U.S. Government
Performance Results Act of 1993, 31 U.S.C. § 1115 (1993).
106 For the logic underlying the California Supreme Court's decision to alter
the relevant legal standard, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. 377 P.2d
897, 901-02 (Cal. 1963) (explaining that the purpose of such liability is to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves).
107 Parallels between frankpledge and the Chinese baojia system of collective
responsibility might be an interesting subject of future study.
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by a separate merchant from town A. 10 8 Collective and vicarious
sanctions exist in modern American law as well. Manufacturers
and suppliers face joint and several tort liability for product
defects. Employers are held vicariously liable for an employee's
wrongful acts committed within the scope of his employment. 109
As Levinson points out, these mechanisms do not reflect a
"primitive" outlook common to pre-liberal, group-based societies.
Rather, they are functional. They help sanctioners address
principal-agent problems. They make "sense when group
members have the capacity to monitor and control the behavior of
some intuitively primary wrongdoer more efficiently than an
external sanctioner." n0 Medieval English authorities lacked a
centralized police force or bureaucratic state to exert
individualized control over all members of society. They lacked a
national credit system for citizens in one town to monitor the debts
of individual merchants from other towns. In these circumstances,
outsiders faced significant problems targeting particular
wrongdoers. Collective liability provided one way to address this
problem. It introduced incentives for members of a frankpledge
group, or merchants from a particular town, to monitor the
behavior of their colleagues and discipline them. Rulers or
sanctioners could thus offload the administrative burden of
identifying and disciplining particular individuals on the group
itself."'
The growth of the modern state has altered some of the
calculus that supports collective sanctions regimes. Urbanization
has broken down clan or kinship bonds that facilitate the intra-
group monitoring that collective sanctions regimes rely on to
function. Development of modern bureaucratic mechanisms (tax
registration and credit bureaus) and legal institutions (independent
national judiciaries) has made identification of individual
wrongdoers easier, and resort to collective or vicarious sanctions
less necessary. Concepts of due process have emerged as a limit on
the ability to sanction individuals for the behavior of another." 2
108 See Levinson, supra note 105, at 359; Avner Greif, Impersonal Exchange
Without Impartial Law: The Community Responsibility System, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109,
124-31 (2004).
109 Levinson, supra note 105, at 360-62.
110 Id. at 426.
111 Id. at 357-59.
112 Id. at 359-62.
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But functional reasons for imposing collective and vicarious
liability continue to exist in many areas. Imposition of joint and
several tort liability for manufacturers and suppliers in modem
product liability cases is motivated by the relative difficulty that
consumers face in identifying the precise wrongdoer in the
production chain that was the source of their injury.113
2.5. Summary
The Chinese government itself is simply a very (very!) large
principal-agent problem. 114 Responsibility systems, in particular
their extensive adoption of strict, collective, and vicarious liability
principles, are a highly refined effort to address this problem.
They are a core component of the way China is governed. This is
not new. Nor is it cultural. It is institutional. Like medieval
English monarchs, central Chinese leaders lack effective ways to
monitor the actions of their local agents. Like modern consumers,
they lack effective means to identify the fault of particular (local
government) actors. Particularly in the context of a large
authoritarian bureaucracy which is hesitant or unwilling to permit
the development of independent institutional channels to monitor
the actions of local officials, numerical responsibility targets tied to
strict, collective, and vicarious liability are quite simply core
mechanisms which allow the center to exercise some degree of
control over their local agents." 5
3. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS
If responsibility systems serve a particular institutional role in
the Chinese system, they also come at a cost. Excessive central
113 Id. at 368. For functional arguments regarding the desirability of applying
collective sanctions for ethical violations by modem American law firms, see
Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336
(2005).
114 According to 2007 Chinese census data, there are roughly 60 million
employees in Party and government organs. NAT'L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF
CHINA, 2007 CHINESE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2007), available at
http://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm. By way of comparison, if
the Chinese Party-state bureaucracy were an independent country, it would be the
19th largest in the world, roughly the same size as France.
115 A separate paper currently in progress by this author traces these efforts'
roots back to Legalist philosophy and Qin practices. Again, this is not to prove a
cultural basis for these elements. To the contrary, it demonstrates the institutional
continuity of both the problems confronted (and responses adopted) by the
Chinese authoritarian bureaucratic state.
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reliance on responsibility systems as a tool for monitoring local
officials fuels a host of practical problems in local Chinese
governance. It also generates tension, and sometimes open
conflict, with the thrust of post-1979 Chinese legal reform efforts.
3.1. An Uneasy Overlap with Legal Norms
Cadre responsibility systems overlap with formal legal norms.
They establish binding norms on official behavior backed up with
career and financial sanctions. In some cases, these reinforce legal
norms. Some responsibility systems expressly purport to be
implementing central laws or regulations.116 Some internalize legal
outcomes and phenomena, such as the loss of an administrative
litigation lawsuit or the creation of open government information
standards that comply with national regulations, in their
evaluation standards for local officials.117
But in other cases, administrative performance targets create
what Mashaw terms an "internal law of administration," existing
in uneasy tension with external legal norms.118 Sometimes, specific
targets set by responsibility systems directly violate legal norms.
For example, some local court responsibility systems sanction
Chinese judges and courts for any instance of cases reversed on
appeal, even those reversed for non-negligent legal error.119 (This
incentivizes a range of problematic behavior on the part of trial
court judges seeking to avoid sanctions for appellate reversal.120)
116 See, e.g., Hebei System, supra note 47 (aimed at implementing the P.R.C
Law on Safe Production and relevant Hebei provincial regulations); Changping
qu caizheng ju guanyu xingzheng xuke shixiang guocuo zeren zhuijiu zhi
[Changping District Finance Bureau Responsibility System Regarding Errors in
Administrative Licensing], issued Jan. 1, 2005 (P.R.C.) (aimed at implementing the
Administrative Licensing Law).
117 Guanyu yinfa Zhenhai qu 2008 niandu xingzheng zhifa zerenzhi he
zhengfu xinxi gongkai mubiao guanli kaohe fang'an de tongzhi [Notice on the
Issuance of the 2008 Annual Evaluation System for the Administrative
Enforcement and Open Government Information Target Responsibility System],
issued July 21, 2008 (P.R.C.).
118 JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 213 (1983).
119 See Minzner, supra note 20, at 70 (discussing the relevant Jiangxi provincial
regulation).
120 Faced with numerical targets for cases reversed on appeal, for example,
many judges resort to an ill-defined system of requesting advance guidance
(qingshi) from higher courts and judges regarding how they should decide cases.
As Chinese judges themselves note, such practices can undermine parties' legal
rights (particularly when the request is made in secret), weaken the value of
appellate review, contribute to passivity and dependency on the part of lower
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Such systems violate two 1998 Supreme People's Court directives
setting clear limits on judicial liability for "incorrectly decided
cases" and barring judicial sanctions for cases reversed for simple
legal error.121
In other cases, responsibility systems create bureaucratic career
incentives that inexorably pressure officials to violate central legal
and Party norms, even if there is no direct facial conflict between
them. For example, the 2005 national "Letters and Visits" (Xinfang)
Regulations require Chinese officials to accept citizen petitions for
the redress of grievances. They also bar official retaliation against
petitioners who bring complaints. 122 But local cadre responsibility
systems severely sanction local officials who experience large
numbers of petitions out of their jurisdictions to higher levels of
government. Faced with this pressure, local Chinese officials
interested in keeping their jobs engage in a wide range of measures
to prevent petitioners from reaching higher authorities, including
illegal detentions, kidnappings, and psychiatric confinements. 123
Mediation targets create similar problematic incentives. As
mentioned earlier, court responsibility systems include rates of
cases closed through judicial mediation as a component of judges'
courts, and inflate the workload of higher courts. Su Yongtong, Bu an "fali" chupai
de gaoyuan yuanzhang [A High People's Court President Who Doesn't Play According to
"Legal Principles"], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Feb. 18, 2009,
available at http://www.infzm.com/content/24067/1; Chai Jianguo & Wang
Yanxia, Duli shenpan yu sifia tizhi gaige [Adjudicate Independence and Judicial System
Reforms], 23 HEBEI FAXUE [HEBEI JURISPRUDENCE] 85, 87 (2005) (providing
comments by the director of the research office of the Hebei HPC). For a similar
point by a vice president of the Jiangsu HPC, see Liao Disheng, Lun sifa gongzheng
xiaolfi de shixian tujing [Discussion on Methods to Realizing Judicial Fairness and
Efficiency], 2 JINLING FALU PINGLUN [JINLING L. REV.] 127, 130. For an extended
discussion on court responsibility systems for incorrectly decided cases, and their
links to qingshi practices, see Minzner, supra note 20.
121 Renmin fayuan shenpan renyuan weifa zeren zhuijiu banfa [The
Responsibility Measures for the Illegal Behavior of Court Personnel], issued Aug.
26, 1998, art. 22 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Responsibility Measures], available at
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/2003-10/5/2103413380.htm; Renmin
fayuan shenpan jilu chufen banfa (shixing) [Experimental Disciplinary Measures
for Court Trials], issued Sept. 7, 1998, art. 4 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Disciplinary
Measures], available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law view.asp?id=395.
122 Xinfang tiaoli [Xinfang Regulations], supra note 7, arts. 3, 46.
123 Minzner, supra note 8, at 103, 120-36, 151-58 (detailing the process for
handling petitions). For a recent account of local government treatment of
petitioners, see Shangfangzhe bei qiangguan jingshenbingyuan [Petitioners Forcibly
Detained in Mental Institution], XIN JING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], Dec. 8, 2008, available
at http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/dqzk/2008/12-08/008@021055.htm.
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evaluations. Chinese authorities have significantly increased the
importance of mediation targets in recent years.124 Chinese courts
and judges have responded to this pressure. According to the
SPC's annual work reports, the ratio of cases resolved through
mediation (as opposed to trial) has drastically shifted in the last
four years. The percentage of civil cases resolved through
mediation rocketed from 31 percent (1.33 million cases) in 2004, to
59 percent (3.17 million cases) in 2008-a 137 percent increase in
the total number of cases closed through mediation in just four
years.125  More striking still is the fact that almost the entire
numerical shift appears to have taken place in a single year-
between 2006 and 2007!126 Chinese judges and legal scholars
express concern that these numerical accomplishments (with some
local courts reporting mediation rates of 99 percent) have been
achieved at the expense of legal requirements of voluntariness in
mediation, sacrificing parties' rights and exacerbating social
tensions.127
Concerns regarding official use of performance targets are not
limited to China. Such targets, coupled with strict liability,
generate concerns in other jurisdictions regarding the extent to
which they impermissibly burden the independence of certain
actors (such as judges) whose autonomous decision-making
authority is valued. In the 1970s, for example, U.S. Social Security
Administration ("SSA") officials adopted a series of initiatives
124 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
125 Compare Zui gao renmin fayuan 2005 nian gongzuo baogao [2005 Sup.
People's Ct. Work Report], issued 2005 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.court.gov.cn/work/200503180013.htm (containing the relevant
statistics for 2004), with Zui gao renmin fayuan 2009 nian gongzuo baogao [2009
Sup. People's Ct. Work Report], issued 2009 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.gov.cn/20091h/content_1261101.htm (containing the corresponding
statistics for 2008).
126 Compare Zui gao renmin fayuan 2007 nian gongzuo baogao [2007 Sup.
People's Ct. Work Report], issued 2007 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=239089 (noting that 30.41%
percent of civil cases were resolved through mediation, while 55.06 percent of
first-instance civil cases were resolved through "mediation and withdrawal of the
case"), with Zui gao renmin fayuan 2008 nian gongzuo baogao [2008 Sup. People's
Ct. Work Report], issued 2008 (P.R.C.), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com
/newscenter/2008-03/22/content_7837838.htm (noting that 50.74% of civil cases
were resolved by "mediation and withdrawal of the case").
127 Fayuan gao tiaojie jiean lv beihou de yinyou [Concerns Behind Courts High Rates
of Case Closure Through Mediation], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], available at
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/0801/2009-06/11/content_1104238.htm (last
visited June 09); Ai Jiahui, supra note 33, at 79-83.
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targeting administrative law judges ("ALJs") with low
productivity rates or high reversal rates for targeted review and
potentially adverse personnel actions.128 These efforts generated a
firestorm of political and legal opposition among ALJs who felt
that these efforts violated their guarantees of "decisional
independence" under the Administrative Procedure Act.12 9
American immigration authorities are currently experimenting
with similar caseload requirements, and raising similar
controversies.30
Even if responsibility targets are not illegal themselves, and
even if they do not incentivize unlawful behavior, they can still
affect how local officials experience legal norms. By refraining
legal norms in terms of hard, numerical targets, backed up by
strict, vicarious, and collective liability, responsibility systems
sensitize officials to particular numerical outcomes rather than
actual norms themselves. Aims and goals expressed in national
law that have not been reduced to hard targets, or are not capable
of being so reduced, may fade in importance. Put simply: if you
are a local Chinese official, do you care more about the vague
language in the 2002 Law on Safe Production about worker rights,
or do you care more about the annual worker death ratio in the
particular responsibility system that governs your salary and
career advancement?
3.2. Interaction with Legal Norms: No Clear Mechanism to Resolve
Conflicts
The relationship between law and responsibility systems is
complicated by the absence of clear institutional mechanisms to
iron out conflicts between the two.
128 Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The
Ddja vu of Decisional Disparity in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 493-4
(2007).
129 Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 676, 680-81 (2d Cir. 1989) (involving an
appeal wherein the court upheld the SSA policies, but only because they did not
apply a strict liability standard with regard to the failure of ALJs to "make target;"
the court noted that the SSA policies did not "dictate the content of the decision"
and found that "[a] minimum number of dispositions an ALJ must decide in a
given period, provided this number is reasonable and not "etched in stone," is not
a prescription of how, or how quickly, an ALJ should decide a particular case").
130 See Shruti Rana, Streamlining the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice
is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 829, 832 (arguing
that the Department of Justice's "streamlining" reforms are undermining judicial
review).
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First, consider the drafting process. With respect to Party
responsibility systems, the lack of clear institutional mechanisms
for ensuring that they correspond with the law simply reflects the
reality of the Chinese political system. Party responsibility systems
are a key element of one-party control.131 Responsibility for
writing them rests with Party institutions, such as organization
bureaus, rather than with the national and local legislatures that
draft China's laws, or the government agencies that enforce them.
Differences can emerge intentionally, such as when publicly
promulgated legal or constitutional norms (regarding the right of
assembly) issued for propaganda purposes simply do not
accurately reflect internal Party interests (regarding political
control). Differences can also emerge unintentionally, for example,
when Party organization bureaus select court responsibility targets
(mediation rates or appellate reversal ratios) for administrative
convenience rather than for precise compliance with legal norms.
But even with regard to run-of-the-mill responsibility systems
used in administrative agencies, practical difficulties exist in
ensuring that they are prepared in accordance with legal norms.
Guttman and Song report that local environmental authorities
(even in developed urban areas) lack both procedures and staff to
evaluate whether pollution targets drafted for local responsibility
systems actually comply with environmental law.132 Lack of
transparency also hinders the ability of both the public and other
government bureaus to provide input as to whether particular
responsibility systems correspond with relevant law. Some
systems and targets are publicly available, but others are not.133
Next, consider the institutional channels that exist for resolving
conflicts in practice. Imagine that you are an official who has been
sanctioned by your bureau for failing to meet a responsibility
target (perhaps a tax or birth control target) that would compel you
(either directly or indirectly) to violate a higher-level legal or Party
norm. What recourse do you have? Might you point out the
inconsistency to your superiors and directly challenge the validity
of the target? Perhaps, but many local responsibility systems vest
power to interpret their language with the same leadership group
131 See Heimer, supra note 39, at 123-25 (discussing how the cadre
responsibility system is used by central authorities to steer the bureaucracy).
132 See Guttman & Song, supra note 46, at 424, 429.
133 See id. at 429 (noting that environmental targets are not public in Beijing,
except for the number of required clean air days).
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that conducts evaluations and issues sanctions. 34  Their
evaluations of complaints regarding the validity of the sanctions
they themselves have issued may be less than neutral. One local
court system hints at this problem, explicitly providing that court
officials who continue to argue with the evaluation committee after
it has made a decision to dock points under the applicable 100-
point scale will be subject to additional point deductions. 135
Limited channels of review exist in such cases-the court
system is not an option. The Law on Administrative Litigation
specifically bars courts from reviewing decisions of administrative
organs regarding personnel rewards or sanctions for their
employees.136  The Law on Administrative Reconsideration
expressly bars reconsideration of the validity of internal bureau
regulations (guizhang).137  The Law on Civil Servants, the
Regulations on Intra-Party Supervision, and the Party Charter do
grant a limited right of review to aggrieved government employees
or Party members subject to disciplinary sanctions. They may
request that the same government or Party entity that issued the
disciplinary sanction, or its immediate superior, review the
decision. 38 But none of these permit review of the legality of the
underlying responsibility targets on which the action is based.
134 Zhenping System, supra note 61, art. 6(1); Yichun Municipal Housing
Management Bureau, 2008 Work Target Evaluation Measures, issued Apr. 25,
2008, arts. 4, 7 (P.R.C.), available at http://xxgk.gaoan.gov.cn/xxgk/fgj/xxgk
/gzdt/zwdt/2008-08/200808061523388755.html; Tianjia'an District Court Work
Target Evaluation Measures, Huainan City, issued Jan. 1, 2003, arts. 10, 12
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.tjacourt.gov.cn/gaige/mubiaokaohe.htm.
135 Zhenping System, supra note 61, art. 3(i).
136 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susong fa [Administrative
Litigation Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., April
4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) 1989 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ.,
art. 12(2, 3) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp
?id=1204.
137 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng fuyi fa [Law on Administration
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
April 29, 1999, effective April 29, 1999) 1999 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG. GAz. (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre
/ laws-and-regulations/ administration/ administrative-reconsideration-law-of-
the-peoples-republic-of-china-1999.html.
138 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongwuyuan fa [Law on Civil Servants]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., April 27, 2005,
effective Jan. 1, 2006) 2006 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.)
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2005-08/10/content
_3333496.htm; Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei jiandu tiaoli (shixing) [CPC
Regulations on Intra-Party Supervision] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
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Redressing problematic responsibility targets, either that create
perverse practical incentives or that conflict with legal norms,
ultimately depends on the willingness of particular higher-level
authorities to expend political capital to push for changes in the
content of local systems. 139 Chinese central authorities regularly
attempt to modify specific responsibility targets in order to address
such problems that arise. The SPC, for example, has made
significant efforts to alter how local court responsibility systems
discipline judges for cases deemed "incorrectly decided" (cuo'an).
In 1998, the SPC issued two directives banning lower courts from
mechanically sanctioning judges for any case reversed on appeal
(on a strict liability basis), even if the error merely resulted from
simple, non-negligent legal error. The SPC directives also required
courts to apply individualized liability for the misconduct of
particular judges, instead of collectively or vicariously disciplining
entire tribunals or court presidents. 140
The impact of the SPC directives has been mixed. Some local
courts, such as the intermediate-level appellate courts in Beijing,
Guangzhou, and Kunming, have expressly amended their local
responsibility systems to comply with the 1998 SPC directives. 141
Nat'l People's Cong., Feb 17, 2004, effective Feb. 17, 2004) 2004 STANDING COMM.
NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com
/newscenter/2005-01/16/content_2467829.htm; Zhongguo gongchandang dang
zhangcheng, [Communist Party Charter], amended Nov. 14, 2002, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-11/18/content_633225.htm.
139 This is reflected in the underlying language of the administration
reconsideration law and the regulations governing the xinfang system, which
allow Chinese citizens to bring petitions regarding official actions. See Xinfang
tiaoli [Xinfang Regulations], supra note 7, art. 32 (providing that xinfang bureaus
should "support" (zhichi) petitions grounded in law, and "supervise and urge"
(ducu) other bureaus to handle them); Law on Administration Reconsideration,
issued Apr. 29, 1999, art. 27 (P.R.C.) (directing administrative reconsideration
organs, if they find that the basis for a particular administrative action is illegal, to
"handle" [chuli] it, or transfer it to another organ).
140 Responsibility Measures, supra note 121; Renmin fayuan shenpan jilti
chufen banfa (shixing) [Experimental Disciplinary Measures for Court Trials],
issued Sept. 7, 1998 [hereinafter Disciplinary Measures], available at
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=395.
141 Kunming shi zhongji renmin fayuan shenpan ting, heyi ting gongzuo
guize (shixing) [Kunming Municipal Intermediate People's Court Trial Tribunals,
Collegiate Judicial Panels Work Principles (Provisional)], issued April 27, 2001,
art. 31 (P.R.C.) [hereafter Kunming Principles]; Guangdong sheng gaoji renmin
fayuan guanyu weifa shenpan zeren zhuijiu de zanxing banfa [Temporary
Measures of the Guangdong Provincial HPC Regarding Responsibility for the
Illegal Behavior of Court Personnel], issued August 30, 2000, art 8(1-3) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Guangdong Measures], available at http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/gj
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But in the ten years since 1998, other courts have implemented
responsibility systems that openly violate the SPC directives by
applying judicial sanctions based on strict, vicarious, and collective
liability for cases reversed on appeal. 42
The SPC's experience with disciplinary reform illustrates the
extent to which core elements of responsibility systems -strict,
vicarious, and collective liability tied to numerical work targets-
are institutionally embedded within the Chinese bureaucracy. It
also illustrates the difficulty that exists in resolving latent conflicts
between responsibility systems and legal norms. If China's highest
court experiences difficulty in altering such practices within their
own bureaucratic hierarchy, and on subjects as mundane as judicial
sanctions for ordinary appellate reversal, imagine the difficulties
that exist in reforming responsibility target practices with regard to
truly sensitive areas (such as petitioning).
3.3. Negative Practical Effects
Apart from their uneasy interaction with legal norms and
institutions, responsibility systems also have a range of negative
practical side effects for Chinese governance.
First, heavy application of strict and vicarious liability to
resolve principal-agent monitoring problems generates classic risks
of "over control." Those on the receiving end of such sanctions
may find themselves driven to take excessively harsh measures
with regard to people they are expected to monitor in order to
ward off their own liability. For example, Title VII imposes
vicarious liability on American employers for individual employee
actions that create a "hostile work environment." Faced with this
pressure, some employers defensively impose blanket controls on
the speech of all employees. This can result in excessively strict,
zero-tolerance policies that infringe on legitimate employee
interests in political and religious speech (e.g., banning a Goya
painting from a university classroom).143
/22/13989.html; Beijing shi di yi zhongji renmin fayuan shenpan renyuan weifa
shenpan zeren zhuijiu shishi xize (shixing) [Implementation Details for the
Responsibility System for Illegal (Behavior) of Trial Officers of the Beijing City
First Intermediate People's Court], issued Apr. 7, 1999, art. 8 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Beijing Details].
142 See linzner, supra note 20, at 63 (discussing judicial sanctions in China).
143 Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment
Law Restrict? 85 GEO. L. J. 627, 642 & n.45 (1997).
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The widespread imposition of strict and vicarious liability on
Chinese Party or government leaders for the actions of their
employees (or of local citizens) generates similar problems. But the
excesses involved are magnified by the absence of significant
bottom-up electoral or legal constraints on official behavior. Bobai
county officials (discussed in the Introduction) faced strict and
vicarious sanctions for failures to make birth control targets. Faced
with these pressures, they rationally (and brutally) decided to
sacrifice villager interests and rights in a harsh coercive campaign.
Party xinfang responsibility systems generate similar behavior.
Concern over vicarious and strict liability resulting from citizen
petitions to higher authorities leads local authorities to resort to
extreme measures to control and suppress petitioners.1"
Second, reliance on collective and vicarious sanctions to govern
contributes to another problem: the dangerous convergence of
interests among local officials faced with sanctions. The birth
control and petitioning examples above illustrate one risk of such
solidarity-the risk of local officials engaging in widespread
collective conspiracies that violate clear central instructions (e.g., no
coercive birth control measures, no retaliation against petitioners)
in their efforts to fulfill responsibility targets set by higher
authorities.
If group members are collectively or vicariously subject to
sanctions for the failings of a single member, they may also simply
decide to cooperate in concealing misbehavior or compliance failure
from higher authorities.145 Local Chinese governance is rife with
examples. As Zhao Shukai notes, municipal, county, township,
and village authorities collude to defeat birth control inspections
by provincial-level leaders. County, township, and village officials
conspire to thwart municipal efforts.146 Ironically, the reliance of
central Chinese authorities on collective and vicarious sanctions
itself helps create the problematic unity of interests among local
officials -the very source of Beijing's enforcement problems.
144 See Minzner, supra note 8, at 154-55 (describing harsh methods employed
by local authorities as a result of xinfang responsibility systems, including
interrogations and arbitrary barring of suspected petitioners attempting to
purchase railway tickets, and instances of violent suppression of petitioners).
145 Cf. Levinson, supra note 105, at 388-91 (discussing this same phenomena
with regard to the frankpledge system in medieval England, in which ten-person
groups devoted particular effort to cover up crimes committed by group members
rather than reporting them).
146 See Zhao, supra note 82, at 248.
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Third, responsibility systems contribute to selective and
distorted policy implementation. As Whiting notes, the
combination of specific performance targets and high financial
incentives in cadre responsibility systems creates moral hazard
problems. Local Chinese authorities "game the system" by
engaging in undesirable behavior to optimize outcomes with
respect to certain target goals.147 They have strong incentives to
focus solely on high-value targets designated as "priority targets
with veto power" (yipiao fojue) that are easily quantifiable and
subject to measurement. They have similarly strong incentives to
overlook other, lower-value targets that are not so easily measured,
or to overlook legal responsibilities that are not factored into their
evaluations. 148 Consequently, as O'Brien and Li have found, local
officials pay significant attention to meeting (or creating the
appearance of meeting) social protest, birth control, and revenue
targets, while disregarding targets such as respecting villagers'
autonomy or limiting peasants' burden.149
These negative effects are amplified when coupled with other
personnel practices, such as the cadre rotation system. Local Party
officials are regularly rotated among positions across the nation.
This theoretically limits their ability to develop local power bases
and ensures that their interests (and loyalties) remain tied to the
bureaucratic apparatus rather than the people they govern in any
particular jurisdiction. However, it also generates negative side
effects. Faced with limited time in a given office and strong
pressure to demonstrate "success" to their superiors on high-value,
easily measurable targets, some local Party cadres sacrifice the
long-term interests of their jurisdictions in favor of short-term
"show" projects. Indeed, responsibility systems that strongly
emphasized economic growth targets in the 1980s and 1990s
spurred many local Party cadres into initiating crash economic
development programs without considering long-term
147 See Whiting, supra note 10, at 112-15 (noting that assignment of "output
value" as a key performance indicator resulted in local cadres supporting
gratuitous economic expansion, without considering the efficiency of production
processes or market demand for products).
148 Id. at 112-15; see also O'Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 173-75 (noting that
policies that have quantifiable output tend to drive out policies that do not,
despite the fact that the latter policies are just as important).
149 O'Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 174. See also supra Section 2.2. and
accompanying text.
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consequences. 150 O'Brien and Li note that one Henan county
leader ordered every village in his jurisdiction to set up a paper
mill within a year. Some one hundred paper mills were built and
the county leader received a promotion on the basis of his
economic accomplishments, but when the mills went bankrupt,
and their environmental consequences became clear, the county
leader had already been rotated to another county, presumably
having reaped the career benefits of his earlier "successes." 151
Fourth, responsibility systems contribute to the
"mistranslation" of central norms. As discussed earlier,
responsibility systems play an important role in "operationalizing"
vague central mandates. They transform central orders into
concrete directives that can be carried out by local officials and
monitored by their superiors.152 But this process invariably alters
the underlying content of the original instructions from above.
The population planning directive in the introduction provides
one such example. The central order set forth clear, broad goals:
greater adherence to population planning rules, no forced
abortions. This order subsequently filtered down through various
levels in the bureaucratic chain of command. But when it emerged
in concrete form in the Bobai county responsibility system, nothing
remained but hard revenue figures and numbers of people to be
swept up in the campaign, coupled with a feeble order to distribute
the central directive in an educational campaign. Faced with these
pressures, local township authorities rationally resorted to coercive
measures that violated the original intent of the central orders.
Recent central efforts regarding rural health reform provide a
second example. On March 17, 2009, central Party and state
officials issued a joint opinion calling for improvements in health
infrastructure. The opinion specifically called for local authorities
to "establish medical health centers in every township, and
undertake different measures to support the construction of village
health clinics, enabling each administrative village to have a village
health clinic, increasing and improving village medical and health
conditions, and improving service quality." 153 The central order
150 See Whiting, supra note 10, at 112-15 (describing long-term dysfunctional
outcomes of local authorities "gaming the system").
151 O'Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 176.
152 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
153 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenhua yiyao weisheng
tizhi gaige de yijian [Opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
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prompted a flurry of activity among local authorities seeking to
demonstrate their compliance. In April, the Xinyang municipal
Party secretary announced that a village health clinic would be
built in each of the municipality's 3,042 administrative villages
within eight months. Each health clinic was expected to use
exactly the same building design and floor plan. Designating this
as a "priority target with veto power" (yipiao fojue), the municipal
Party secretary issued an order stating that township party
secretaries who failed to make this target would be relieved of their
posts. Township officials subsequently leaped into action,
requiring village medical workers to construct or remodel their
health clinics in accordance with the pre-approved blueprints as a
condition of continuing to practice medicine.154
These targets generated resistance. Village medical workers in
one county noted that the proposed plan would require the
abandonment of a large number of recently constructed health
clinics (some one-third of the clinics in the county) -clinics that
met provincial standards but did not correspond to the chosen
municipal floor plan. Noting that the plan would only reimburse
one-quarter the cost of building the clinics, many village medical
workers also asserted that they would have to abandon medicine
rather than comply with the building requirements, leaving their
villages without practicing medical personnel. Expressing doubt
that they could actually fulfill the requirements, dozens of other
workers nonetheless signed responsibility agreements with
township officials, promising to construct the required clinics by
the end of September.155
Note that in both examples described above, the process of
translating the original central directive (strengthen population
planning work, improve rural health work) into specific
responsibility targets (ensuring that a specified number of women
have tubal ligations, building a precisely defined structure by a
precisely defined date) effectively generated pressures (forced
and the State Council Regarding Deepening Reform to the Drug and Health
Systems], issued Mar. 17, 2009 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg
/2009-04/06/content_1278721.htm.
154 Xinyang tui "bieshu weishengshi" ling cunyi xian kunjing [Xinyang Effort to
Promote 'Villa-Style Medical Clinics" Places Village Doctors in a Difficult Position], XIN
JING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], June 11, 2009 [hereinafter Village Doctors].
155 Id.
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abortions, encouraging medical personnel to leave the profession)
that contravened the intent of the original central orders.
Why does this happen?
Two possible answers present themselves immediately. The
local Chinese officials in question might just be very incompetent.
Their selection of particular targets might reflect crude work
attitudes or an inability to fully comprehend (and implement) the
rarified goals of central policies. Alternatively, central Chinese
officials might be engaged in a conspiracy of silence. They might
fully intend for policies regarding birth control or petitioners to be
brutally implemented. Under this interpretation, language in
central directives (such as language that bars coercive birth control
measures) is nothing but "window dressing," to be ignored by
local authorities or countermanded by secret instructions from
central officials that reflect their "real" interests.
There is some truth behind each explanation. Incompetent
officials cause policy mis-implementation in every country. Some
targets are explicitly chosen (and concealed) for authoritarian
political purposes. However, these explanations do not fully
suffice. Not all instances of policy mis-implementation reflect
pervasive stupidity on the part of local officials, and the center
certainly does not affirmatively intend for local authorities to
engage in economic development or rural health plans that waste
central resources.
This leaves room for a third explanation. At a deeper
institutional level, the process of transmitting directives within the
Chinese bureaucracy actually alters the underlying content.
Central Party and government officials issue broad instructions to
local authorities such as "follow the law" or "represent interests of
residents in your jurisdiction" as part of promulgating new policies
aimed at environmental conservation or economic development.
But local officials in Party organizational bureaus or county
governments do not enjoy the luxury of incorporating these same
principles in the responsibility systems they draft to implement the
central will. Such standards are too difficult to monitor. They also
run the risk of creating independent standards (popular
satisfaction, legal norms) that conflict with core principles of
Leninist one-party rule. Consequently, Chinese responsibility
systems are drawn to translating central directives into numerical
targets. They are particularly drawn to targets that can be checked
up on. Ordering every local village to build a clinic with exactly
the same floor plan by a particular date makes sense from this
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perspective -Party or government officials can theoretically
inspect a village clinic to see if it is in compliance. They cannot do
that with broad instructions to "improve village health."15 6
Distortion can be conceived in other terms as well.
Transmission of higher-level directives down through the Chinese
bureaucracy resembles the children's game of "telephone," in
which a child whispers a phrase in the ear of another, in sequence.
Just as the original spoken sentence becomes twisted as it makes its
way from child to child, the express content of central instructions
becomes distorted as they descend through the bureaucratic
hierarchy. The relatively closed Chinese political system (like the
closed nature of children's communication in the game of
"telephone") contributes to this. Lack of governmental
transparency, restricted channels for political participation by
citizens, and lack of judicial channels to challenge responsibility
systems that violate central norms mean that citizens (and other
officials) are often unable to "shout out" when central norms
become distorted at a particular step during the process of
reducing them to concrete responsibility targets.157  Complex
shades are lost; nuances degrade. What gets remembered (and
repeated) are clear, hard numbers and instructions ("no petitioners
to Beijing in the next year").
This fourth point differs somewhat from those made in the
policy mis-implementation literature discussed above. Particular
responsibility systems and targets do create perverse incentives
that twist the behavior of local officials. However, part of the
reason why these targets are selected reflects an institutional
problem facing the Chinese system, a problem much deeper than
nonsensical or authoritarian targets chosen by individual leaders.
The nature of responsibility systems locks Chinese authorities into
expressing themselves in particular ways (reversed case ratios,
mediation targets, etc.) that may not fully correspond with original
central wishes. Further, the process of transmitting norms between
levels within the system and generating responsibility systems
156 Similarly, responsibility systems are drawn toward enforcing targets
through strict or vicarious liability, such as suspending the licenses of local
doctors for failing to meet particular targets.
157 Naturally, some channels do exist for the airing of problematic targets.
See, e.g., Village Doctors, supra note 154 (illustrating the ability of one independent-
leaning Beijing publication to expose problematic targets).
[Vol. 31:1
HeinOnline  -- 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 104 2009-2010
RIOTS AND COVER-UPS
inherently introduces a degree of "information decay" that ensures
the responsibility systems can not fully reflect central intentions.
Finally, excessive reliance on top-down responsibility systems
risks undermining official Chinese efforts to develop stable
institutions of governance. For officials and citizens alike, targets
and their liability regimes matter. This is not necessarily true for
institutions in which the targets are embedded. At least in some
cases, formal legal institutions and procedures devolve into a
shadow puppet show around which the real game of responsibility
targets plays itself out.
What happens to officials? Judges become sensitized to
mediation rates. Administrators become sensitized to numbers of
mine explosions or traffic accidents. Party and government
officials become sensitized to numbers of petitions, particularly
mass petitions. Faced with this pressure, procedural norms (e.g.,
requirements of voluntariness in mediation) and substantive
considerations (e.g., legal merit of petitioners' complaints) erode
and give way.
Citizens have similar experiences. They find that relying on
formal norms and procedures governing state institutions is of
limited value in resolving their grievances. They learn that
responsibility targets offer a more direct button to push in their
effort to trigger a state reaction. Disgruntled parties discover that
threatening to mount a mass petition or disseminating
inflammatory (or false) information on the Internet provides more
effective levers with which to force officials to heel, rather than
proceeding step-by-step through the legal machinery of
administrative reconsideration or litigation.158
This complex state-society relationship has a corrosive effect on
institutions. It erodes the authority of the courts, encourages
citizens to escalate their grievances in the streets, and breeds a
strongly reactive outlook on the part of officials, who find
themselves driven to respond to the external manifestations of
underlying problems rather than their roots.
158 See generally Minzner, supra note 8 (examining the ways in which the
xinfang system creates problematic behavioral incentives for citizen petitioners).
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3.4. Summary
This leads to the second central argument of this paper.
Chinese leaders' existing strategy for addressing the principal-
agent problems at the heart of the Chinese bureaucracy is itself the
cause of many governance problems that they seek to address.
Central reliance on top-down application of strict, collective, and
vicarious liability linked to responsibility targets as a tool to govern
their local agents incentivizes problematic behavior on the part of
local officials, particularly in the absence of effective bottom-up
institutional channels for citizens to participate politically or
resolve their grievances. While these strategies do allow central
Party authorities some degree of control over local officials in the
short-term, they have a destructive long-term impact on Chinese
society and governance, undermining efforts of central Chinese
authorities to effectively monitor and supervise their subordinates.
4. NEW PERSPECrIVES ON CHINESE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
This Article offers several new perspectives on Chinese law
and governance. It deepens our understanding of how the Chinese
legal and political systems operate. It also helps explain recent
domestic political choices made by central leaders, raises important
questions regarding the future impact of these choices on the legal
system, and provides practical suggestions for advancing legal
reform in China.
4.1. Responsibility Systems: A Core Element of Chinese Law and
Governance
First, this Article identifies the key functional role of Chinese
cadre responsibility systems. Central leaders face pervasive
principal-agent problems in governing China. Cadre responsibility
systems' application of strict, collective, and vicarious liability for
success or failure in reaching target goals is an institutional
response to these problems. These measures bear some
resemblance to those adopted by other legal systems confronted
with principal-agent problems in particular fields. American
administrative law scholars seeking to explore the utility of
collective or vicarious sanctions as a mechanism to control
bureaucratic behavior might find that internal Chinese Party and
state practices offer a fertile field for comparative analysis.
Responsibility systems based on strict, collective, and vicarious
liability principles are not simply post-1949 inventions of Party
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authorities. Their roots stretch much further back in Chinese
imperial history.159 This Article, however, does not argue that these
elements of responsibility systems are rooted in Chinese culture.
Rather, their continuity exists because the underlying institutional
problem facing Chinese leaders has remained the same across both
the imperial and modem periods. Chinese central authorities lack
effective channels to monitor and evaluate the actions of their local
agents. They remain highly uncomfortable with allowing the
development of bottom-up institutional channels that could help to
monitor and check local authorities, precisely because they fear
these channels might develop to limit the power of the emperor or
central Party officials as well. Faced with these problems, top-
down responsibility systems tied to the personnel apparatus
remain the preferred governance tool for a bureaucratic and
authoritarian Chinese state.
Second, this Article challenges several prevailing assumptions
regarding China. The Chinese legal and political systems are
characterized by a wide gap between the way things are supposed
to work ("law on the books") and the way they actually do ("law in
practice"). Central laws or directives emphasize rigorous
enforcement of intellectual property or environmental protection
norms. But actual implementation of these policies by local
officials can range from spotty to non-existent. National
institutions issue formal laws or regulations that create institutions
(such as courts) to handle citizen grievances. But many citizens
choose to bypass these institutions in favor of less formal ones
(such as direct petitioning of higher-level authorities).
Confronted with this disconnect, observers often find
themselves resorting to one of two explanations. Some point to
cultural or educational factors. Under this view, the reason that
local officials fail to implement central policies (or violate them) is
because the officials are uneducated or lack a proper
understanding of the law.160 Rural citizens allegedly fail to use
159 A separate work currently in progress by this author traces these efforts
back to core principles of Legalist philosophy and Qin (221-206 BCE) dynastic
practices.
160 For example, some argue that Chinese judges' lack of legal education
leads them to misunderstand how law or the judicial system "should" operate.
See, e.g., Faguan suzhi di zhiyue zhifa shuiping [Low Quality of Judges Constrains
the Quality of Execution Work of Legal Judgments], SouTHCN, July 7, 2002,
available at http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/gdtodayimportant
/200207191435.htm.
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legal institutions for the same reasons.161  These views are
frequently expressed in dismissive comments that the "quality" of
local officials or citizens is simply too low (suzhi tai di) to appreciate
how central policies are supposed to work.
Other observers rely on a vague "external Party interference"
rubric to explain the gap between the law on the books and the
way things work in practice. This view paints a picture of a hazy
and monolithic institution called "the Party" that interferes with
the legal system in a heavy-handed manner. It issues broad
political directives that expand or contract room for legal reforms.
It directly intervenes to ensure the arrests and convictions of
political dissidents. And it violates legal and constitutional norms
with periodic political campaigns that shutter newspapers or close
internet chat-rooms.162
This Article suggests that both descriptions are incomplete.
Not all local Chinese officials are uneducated simpletons, wildly
pursuing nonsensical policies. Rather, many are highly rational
actors responding to specific incentive structures created by local
responsibility systems. Heavy emphasis by local courts on
mediation, abusive birth control enforcement campaigns by some
local authorities, and the lack of attention by local officials to
national environmental laws and policies do not reflect a lack of
legal consciousness by local authorities. Nor do they reflect an
ignorance of the "modern rules of the game." If anything, they
often reflect the opposite - an acute and finely-tuned sensitivity on
the part of local authorities towards fulfilling (or appearing to
fulfill) the particular performance criteria they face under local
responsibility systems.
Attention to the incentives established by responsibility
systems can help explain actions of particular Chinese legal actors
that can be difficult to understand at first glance. For example,
comprehensive works on Chinese law note in passing the common
resort by lower courts to an ill-defined qingshi system to solicit the
views of higher courts and judges regarding how to decide
pending cases (and avoid appellate reversal). But they do not fully
161 Another expression of this view comes in the form of arguments that
traditional Confucian views contribute to citizen distrust of courts and the legal
system. See, e.g., QING-YUN JIANG, CouRT DELAY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA
24-25 (2006), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content
/nluh6614n46122u1.
162 Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, N. Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 28, 2005, at Al.
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explain the reasons motivating Chinese courts and judges to rely
on qingshi requests, particularly in light of express SPC efforts to
curtail such practices. 163 In contrast, an examination of local court
responsibility systems, particularly the disciplinary sanctions that
they mete out to judges for incorrectly decided cases reversed on
appeal, helps illuminate the underlying incentives motivating such
behavior.
This Article also suggests the need for a more nuanced
understanding of the Party's role in the Chinese system. True,
Party authorities do make broad policy decisions regarding how
China is run. They also clearly retain the power to intervene in
specific instances, such as cases involving dissidents. But an even
more significant and underappreciated source of Party influence
on the legal system arises from the role of Party organization
bureaus and committees in setting particular performance targets
for judges and other officials, and deciding whether judges and
officials have fulfilled them.
Third, this analysis suggests that the academic study of
Chinese law may need to shift in focus. Modern research into
Chinese law has, until recently, tended to emphasize formal legal
norms enunciated by judicial bodies such as the SPC and
legislative entities such as the NPC. This is because these
institutions have become important since 1978. As central Party
authorities have strategically pulled back from routine governance
matters, the SPC and NPC have acquired significant
responsibilities over adjudication and law-making. Others reasons
exist as well. These institutions resemble what many Westerners
think legal institutions "should" look like. Chinese legislative and
judicial leaders employ terminology and concepts familiar to
American legal academics. Many have studied in the United States
or in other countries. They are natural subjects of study.
163 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TO THE RULE OF LAW 314-
15 (2002) (generally describing the undue influence higher courts exert on lower
courts in China); see also Zhao Shuping, Woguo fayuan zai juti anjian shang shiyong
falu de qingshi yu pifu de lixing sikao [Thoughts on Chinese Court Use of Qingshi
Requests and Replies in the Application of Law in Concrete Cases], J. HUNAN PUB. SEC.
COLL. 35, 36 (2004). In contrast, the link between qingshi and court disciplinary
treatment is noted in the CONG.-EXEC. COMM'N ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at
78-81 (2d Sess. 2004); see also Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China's WATO Commitment on
Independent Judicial Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L.
77, 104-05 (2004).
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But this analytical lens is too simplistic. It ignores how the
Chinese bureaucracy actually works, overlooking the core role that
Party institutions continue to play in interpreting abstract
behavioral norms and setting concrete incentives for officials. This
analytical lens also misses the extent to which the Party-
administered personnel system is a key component of the
bureaucratic-authoritarian institutional framework that has run
China for the past two thousand years. Simply because foreign
observers are not accustomed to viewing central Party circulars,
the Party Organization Department, and local responsibility
systems as "legal" in nature-and because some may have
normative reactions against doing so -we may be missing some of
the key institutions that actually interpret, operationalize, and
implement Chinese legal norms. This bias is not limited to
Western observers. Prominent Chinese legal scholars note the
same tendency within Chinese academia to overlook the role of
institutions, such as Party responsibility systems, because they do
not correspond to an idealized view of what law "should" look
like.164
Some scholars explicitly recognize this disconnect. A growing
number of political scientists and sociologists regularly cross the
border between law and administration in analyzing how the
Chinese state actually operates. 165 This realization is spreading in
legal academia as well. In 2003, Donald Clarke warned against
simplistic and superficial comparisons between Chinese and
foreign institutions (specifically between the NPC and the US
Congress, or between the formal administrative legal norms of
both countries) without taking into account the deep political and
structural differences of how the two countries actually operate.166
A few legal scholars explicitly analyze Party institutions and
directives alongside their formal legal counterparts, for example, as
Ben Liebman did in his comprehensive study of the Chinese
164 Interview with Zhu Suli, Dean, Beijing University Law School Uune 27,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with He Weifang, Professor, Beijing
University Law School (Aug. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
165 See, for example, the works of Kevin O'Brien, Susan Whiting, and Andrew
Mertha in the field of political science, and Ethan Michelson and Sida Liu in the
field of sociology.
166 Donald C. Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: W'hen is a Riddle
Just a Mistake?, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM, 93-121 (Stephen Hsu
ed., 2003).
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media.167 However, this is still far from mainstream practice.
Foreign scholarship on the Chinese legal system is still replete with
articles that merely take the text of some recently promulgated
Chinese statute, and then analyze it in isolation or simply
juxtapose it with corresponding Western statutes.168
What direction should the study of Chinese law take? The
relevant field of vision must continue to broaden. It needs to
accurately correspond with the integrated concept of zhengfa
(politics and law) employed by Chinese Party officials. In China,
national laws, such as the 2007 Property Law, are often preceded
by both draft legal opinions of scholars and broad Party directives
giving general policy guidance. It is an environment where those
laws are implemented locally by both formal government
regulations and official Party instructions. Furthermore, those
laws, once implemented, are often the target of citizen petitioning
efforts that employ both legal rhetoric and Party slogans in an
effort to change them. In light of this, it does not make sense to
separate the study of "law" from the study of "Party directives."
Legal analysis must therefore be adapted to the study of Party
documents and institutions. Legal scholars are accustomed to
using textual and comparative analyses to dissect government
rules and regulations. Why not use those high-powered tools on
the mass of Party documents that set out norms of behavior for
Party and government officials? Many of these are openly
available in one form or another on Party and government
websites. This would give legal scholars a much more nuanced
and accurate view of how legal and bureaucratic norms are
actually interpreted and implemented.
What would this mean in practice? Think about how one
might draft a textbook on Chinese law. You are trying to explain
to a student how rules governing the behavior of Chinese officials
and citizens are actually made and implemented. Should you
write something like an American or European textbook, setting
167 See Liebman, supra note 86, at 14-59 (analyzing the interaction between
the Chinese media, legal system, and Party institutions).
168 See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism:
Reconsidering China's Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 379 (2009) (analyzing
China's new Antimonopoly Law); C. Stephen Hsu, Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 115 (2007) (describing the doctrinal structure
of the new Contract Law); Aashish Srivastava, No Rice, No Wife to Cook: An
Analysis of the Electronic Signatures Law of China, 13 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 437
(2005) (providing an overview of the PRC Electronic Signatures Law).
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forth constitutional provisions and statutes, followed by
interpretative regulations and cases? Or should you proceed by
choosing a sweeping central Party directive -for example, a central
circular on "harmonious society" - identifying the formal legal and
regulatory changes that follow in its wake, then analyzing the
specific Party and administrative personnel responsibility systems
that implement these changes through the Chinese bureaucratic
apparatus? Or should you adopt a side-by-side approach,
devoting half the book to the norms and procedures of the
National People's Congress and Supreme People's Court, and the
other half to those of the Central Party Committee, Organization
Bureau, and Disciplinary Inspection Committee? Either of the
latter two options would present a more realistic representation of
how China actually operates. 169
4.2. Responsibility Systems: A Necessary Target for Chinese Legal
Reformers
Appreciating the role of responsibility systems is not merely a
question of improving our academic understanding of how China
operates. It also helps to identify both practical problems in local
Chinese governance, as well as potential solutions.
Excessive reliance by central authorities on Party-led
responsibility systems to govern generates serious conflicts with
the Chinese legal system. This is partly a result of the content of
many of these systems, which reflect the interests of a one-Party
political system, with strong emphasis on maintaining tight social
control. Requiring officials to meet strict (and high) targets for
judicial convictions or similar (low) numbers of permissible mass
citizen petitions unavoidably generates conflict with purported
legal protections for citizen rights. But conflict also arises because
of the general disconnect between the process by which
responsibility systems are established and those by which legal
norms are adopted. There is simply no institutional guarantee that
these two mesh.
Excessive reliance on top-down responsibility systems also
fuels a range of practical governance problems. Widespread
application of collective and vicarious liability strengthens
169 Naturally, examining formal Party documents, even in conjunction with
formal legal ones, is still insufficient to understand how things actually work in
practice. There will always be a gap between de jure institutional norms (whether
legal or Party) and de facto practice.
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destructive convergences of interests among local officials, and can
facilitate their efforts to conceal governance failures from central
officials. Extensive reliance on strict liability for success or failure
in meeting responsibility targets sensitizes local officials to making
particular numerical goals, contributing to policy mis-
implementation among local officials.
How does one resolve these problems? One answer is to alter
the concrete incentives that cadre responsibility systems create for
local authorities. Simply relying on formal laws and regulations
issued by institutions such as the SPC, NPC, and State Council is
insufficient. No number of well-meaning central policy
statements, national laws, or official speeches will suffice to reduce
the repressive tactics employed by local officials against citizen
petitioners, as long as local responsibility systems continue to
make the numbers of petitions one of the most important factors in
assessing local Party officials' work.170 Similarly, SPC efforts to
reduce qingshi requests to higher courts will not be successful
absent comprehensive measures to alter the incentives present in
local court responsibility systems that push local judges to resort to
such practices in the first place.
What does this mean practically for domestic and foreign
organizations interested in pursuing legal reform in China? The
focus cannot just be on drafting national laws. Rather, it must
include the concrete criteria by which officials are evaluated. Do
not limit your cooperative programs to the National People's
Congress and other legislative bodies. Rather, try to ensure that
representatives from the Party organization bureau attend your
conferences as well. Encourage them to talk to the attendees from
the legal affairs offices of the local people's congresses. Work to
ensure that internal Party personnel norms reflect the same
standards as publicly promulgated legal ones.
But if central Chinese officials are really interested in
addressing some of the fundamental problems in local Chinese
governance, merely tinkering with specific criteria used to evaluate
local Chinese officials may be insufficient. Instead, officials need to
come up with a better institutional response to the principal-agent
problem at the heart of Chinese governance. This requires
structural political and legal reforms. It requires independent
bottom-up channels for citizens to redress their grievances, check
170 See Minzner, supra note 8, at 151-58 (describing xinfang responsibility
systems, the incentives they establish, and their effects).
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government misconduct, and participate in the decisions that affect
their lives. What form this takes -whether modified versions of
Western-style courts, Party disciplinary commissions, or even the
imperial Chinese censorate-is not important. The function of
these reforms is.
Foreign and domestic activists seeking to advance these kinds
of reforms in China, may want to tone down their normative
arguments. Rights-based arguments, invocations of international
legal norms, or negative comparisons of Chinese practices may be
useful if activists are trying to mobilize domestic and international
public opinion to condemn China. But the willingness of outside
actors to resort to such strategies is rapidly weakening in a world
where foreign governments increasingly find official Chinese
cooperation essential in handling issues such as North Korea,
international nuclear proliferation, and global financial stability.
Moreover, the effectiveness of relying on such strategies alone is
questionable. Moralistic lecturing by Westerners can generate a
nationalistic backlash among the domestic Chinese public. It can
also lead to Chinese cynicism about foreign motives when Western
governments sacrifice (or use) their own principles for concrete
political purposes. Finally, Chinese Party authorities focused on
maintaining their own political power simply are not that likely to
be moved by normative arguments about what they should or
should not do.
This Article, however, does provide activists another arrow in
their quiver of strategies to promote political and legal reform in
China. It provides a dispassionate argument that Chinese leaders'
own governance practices are undermining the stability of their
country, and that addressing this problem is in the interests of
central authorities themselves. Naturally, not all will heed this call.
However, it may resonate with those Chinese officials and citizens
who are seriously concerned with the future of their country. It
also allows outsiders who seek to raise issues of domestic Chinese
political reform an alternative vehicle that contrasts favorably to
the two strategies commonly pursued: confrontational normative
moralizing and active avoidance of the issues.
This Article's argument that the underlying problem and
solutions facing China are institutional in nature may help limit the
possibility of a nationalist backlash to calls for political reform.
China does not need to adopt Western political culture, values, or
systems. Rather, it needs domestically-generated political reform
plans that address the institutional principal-agent problem at the
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heart of Chinese politics, that order to open up bottom-up legal
and political channels, and that adequately respond to the needs of
Chinese citizens themselves.
4.3. A Turn Away From Legal Institutions in Favor of Responsibility
Systems?
Many Chinese authorities already recognize the problems that
result from exclusively relying on top-down monitoring strategies
to control their local agents.171 Over the last two decades, Chinese
authorities have consequently allowed legal institutions to emerge
as limited bottom-up fora providing popular input into -and
supervision of -local government. The Administrative Litigation
Law, Administrative Licensing Law, and Regulations on Open
Government Information have opened channels for ordinary
citizens to contest and challenge actions of local officials.172 The
role of national and local legislatures in policy-making has
increased. Authorities have experimented with holding public
hearings and soliciting academic and citizen input on draft laws
and regulations.
The aim of these efforts is better resolution of the age-old
principal-agent problem at the core of Chinese governance.
Bottom-up citizen supervision of local officials aids central
authorities. It helps address information gaps. Local officials can
easily hide ongoing corruption from central work teams that drop
in only periodically. It is much more difficult for them to conceal
misbehavior from the tens of thousands of residents living in their
jurisdiction. By allowing citizens to bring administrative lawsuits,
central authorities can essentially "deputize" the public at large to
monitor local officials' compliance with national laws. Increased
citizen input into the policy-making process through legislative or
administrative hearings provides similar benefits. It helps ensure
that local plans implementing education, environmental, or
economic development policies are not simply drafted to respond
171 O'Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 176-181.
172 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susong fa [Law on
Administrative Litigation], issued Apr. 4, 1989 (P.R.C.); Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xingzheng xuke fa [Law on Administrative Licensing], issued Aug. 27,
2003 (P.R.C.); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkao tiaoli
[Regulations on Open Government Information], issued May 1, 2008 (P.R.C.).
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to the interests of a select few who happen to have the ear of local
officials.
Chinese citizens have actively used the increased space
provided by these central reforms. Over the last decade, the ranks
of Chinese public interest lawyers and activists have swelled. They
have used China's laws and regulations to challenge a range of
local government actions. These involve issues ranging from
environmental pollution1 73 to hepatitis discrimination 74 to electoral
fraud.175 In 2003, following the death of a young migrant named
Sun Zhigang in police custody, legal activists even targeted a
national-level policy: a controversial - and extralegal - form of
administrative detention known "custody and repatriation" (C&R).
Buoyed by a wave of public outrage and media coverage
surrounding Sun's death, legal activists petitioned national
authorities, challenging the constitutional and legal basis of the
regulations governing the C&R system. Central authorities
avoided the more controversial elements of the petitions, such as
calls for China's national legislature to exercise its constitutional
and legal authority to supervise the actions of the executive branch
of government, the State Council. However, Chinese authorities
did take concrete steps to appease public anger. Less than two
months after the story surrounding Sun's death broke in the
national media, the State Council itself announced the withdrawal
of the C&R regulations, replacing them with a system of voluntary
aid stations for vagrants and beggars. 76
Some Chinese authorities are growing uncomfortable with the
energies they have unleashed. Central officials are certainly
173 The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims is a non-
governmental environmental protection organization established in China in
1998. Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, http://www.clapv.org
/new/en/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
174 See Chen Qian, Hepatitis-B Carriers Win Right to Attend School, SHANGHAI
DAILY, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2008
/200811/20081121/article_381528.htm (discussing activists' use of the legal
system to guarantee the right of Hepatitis-B carriers to attend school).
175 See EastSouthWestNorth: The Tashi (China) Elections-Part I
(Chronology), http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050919_1.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2009) (discussing a 2005 recall campaign mounted by residents in Taishi village
against their village committee head).
176 For an excellent analysis of the Sun Zhigang incident, see Keith J. Hand,
Using Law For a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of
Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 114
(2006).
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interested in seeing legal institutions and citizen participation
develop as effective tools to assist national Party authorities in
managing and controlling an unruly bureaucracy. However, they
do not want these tools evolving into independent checks on Party
power.17 7 They also most certainly do not want to see China's legal
activists developing into a force for organizing the discontented,
launching thinly veiled political challenges to Party power.
Chinese officials have responded in a variety of ways. These range
from garden-variety harassment of public interest lawyers
representing clients in high-profile cases, 178 to issuance of broad
directives requiring lawyers representing clients in mass cases to
accept government supervision and guidance,17 9 to promulgating
internal directives that explicitly bar courts from handling
particular types of cases.180
In the spring of 2008, Chinese authorities escalated these
efforts. After serving as president of the SPC for ten years, Xiao
Yang retired in March 2008. Xiao possessed an extensive legal
background in the procuracy, had previously served as Minister of
Justice, and had been closely identified with efforts to
professionalize the Chinese judiciary. He was not replaced with a
judge, lawyer, or someone with a professional legal background.
Rather, central authorities elevated Wang Shengjun, a former
provincial public security head who had risen to national
prominence within Party political circles, to head China's
177 See, for example, the statements of Politburo member Jia Qinglin in
Zhonggong zhongyang zhaokai zuotanhui tingqu dangwai renshi dui shenru sifa tizhi
gaige de yijian [Central Committee Holds Forum to Listen to Non-Party Representatives
Suggestions Regarding Judicial Reform], XINHUA, Nov. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200811/29/333020.shtml (noting that
Chinese judicial reform will "strengthen the supervision of [official] power," but
that it will "unswervingly" "uphold Party leadership.").
178 Chris Buckley, China Milk Victim Lawyers Say Pressed to Quit, REUTERS,
Sept. 28, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/naturalResources
/idUSPEK28081820080929?sp=true.
179 All China Lawyers Ass'n, Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers
Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass Nature, CONG.-ExEc COMM'N
CHINA, Mar. 20, 2006, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad
/index.phpd? showsingle=53258.
180 Guangxi fayuan bu shouli 13 lei anjian sheng gaoyuan cheng you guoqing
jueding [Guangxi Court Will Not Accept 13 Types of Cases, Provincial Court Says
Decision Made Out of Consideration of National Condition], CHINA YouTH DAILY, Aug.
24 2004, available at http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/yjdt
/20040824100627.htm.
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judiciary.181 Mere months after Wang assumed office, Chinese
courts found themselves in the throes of a new political
campaign-the "Three Supremes" - emphasizing "the supremacy
of Party work, the supremacy of popular interests, and the
supremacy of the constitution and law." 182 While this language
does include law as a guiding source for court work, comments by
other officials suggest that the campaign is actually aimed at
curbing excessive reliance by judges on law in deciding cases,
particularly if doing so contributes to social unrest or conflict. As
one municipal court official noted in explaining the content of the
"Three Supremes":
For a relatively long period of time, some units and
individuals have been accustomed to simply emphasizing
the supremacy of the constitution and the law .... Simply
handling cases, mechanically handling cases, handling
cases in isolation, and generating petitions or causing
[people] to be in confrontation with judges, these
phenomena are not few in number. Experience teaches us
only emphasizing the constitution and the law is
insufficient. Each official carrying out the law must
understand that strictly handling cases according to the law
will only have significant autonomy and vitality when
unified with Party work and the interests of the people. 8 3
In the summer of 2009, Beijing officials took further steps to
curtail the activities of public interest lawyers: they closed one of
the most prominent domestic legal activist organizations, the Open
Constitution Initiative ("OCI"), arrested one of its founders, Xu
181 Zuigao renmin fayuan yuanzhang Wang Shengjun jianli [Curriculum
Vitae of Supreme People's Court President Wang Shengjun], Mar. 16, 2008,
available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-16/110915159271.shtml.
182 Wang Shengjun: Fayuan gongzuo bixu jianchi 'sangezhishang' zhidao sixiang
[Wang Shengjun: Court Work Must Uphold the Guiding Thought of the "Three
Supremes"], XUEXI SHIBAO [STUDY TIMEs], June 16, 2008, available at
http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/ldhd/2008-06/16/content_48466.htm. See also
Posting of Jerome Cohen to http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china
_law-profjblog/2008/10/jerome-cohen-1.html (Oct. 22, 2008).
183 Wu Zhaoshun, Gaoyang zhengfa duiwu jianshe de zhuxuanlu [Raise Up the
Theme of Constructing Political-Legal Ranks], CHINACOURT, May 29, 2008, available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200805/29/304643.shtm.
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Zhiyong, and disbarred other lawyers who had handled public
interest cases.184
It's not entirely clear what these developments indicate. The
Chinese Communist Party and government are far from
monolithic. In the shifting factional melange of modem Chinese
politics, existing central attitudes may be simply nothing more
than a temporary blip that will shift when prevailing political
winds change. Current resistance to the role of law may simply be
the modern parallel to that faced by state-owned enterprise reform
in 1990s - a transitory period in China's long-term process of
economic and social modernization. 185
On the other hand, it might not be. Chinese legal reform might
actually be encountering some fundamental limits. Since 1989,
Chinese authorities have adhered to one core political tenet: that
under no circumstances will they allow the supremacy of Party
power to be called into question. In the interest of maintaining this
power, Chinese authorities intervened in the 1990s to curb
experiments with local elections, aimed at providing better popular
supervision of official power, when activists began to use elections
to mount organized challenges to core principles of Party
control. 186 Chinese authorities moved in the early 2000s to clamp
down on civil society organizations when these groups, initially
tolerated as providing a forum for popular participation into the
political system, began to stage high-profile challenges to central
184 See Zhu Zhe & Cui Xiaohuo, Legal Aid Group Told to Pack Up, CHINA DAILY,
July 18, 2009 (discussing Chinese authorities' closure of OCI for improper
registration, imposing a 1.4 million yuan [$200,0001 fine for improperly receiving
financial contributions). See also Michael Wines, Public-Interest Lawyer is Held in
China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at A6 (detailing the arrest of Xu Zhiyong on tax
evasion charges).
185 See Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song & Yang Yao, Impact and Significance of State-
Owned Enterprise Restructuring in China, 55 CHINA J. 35 (2006) (discussing the
acceleration of privatization in China in the late 1990s after initial resistance). But
see The Second Long March, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 30-32 (noting that
government support for privatization has declined, in part out of social stability
concerns).
186 See Kevin O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, Accommodating "Democracy" in a One-
Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China, in ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN
GREATER CHINA 101, 101-25 (Larry Diamond & Ramon H. Myers eds., 2001)
(describing the evolution of village elections since 1980). See also Linda Jakobsen,
Local Governance: Village and Township Direct Elections, in GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
97, 108-10 (Jude Howell ed., 2004) (discussing Chinese authorities suppression of
experiments with direct township elections).
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development plans. 87 Recent events suggest that Chinese officials
may have drawn similar conclusions with regard to legal reform
efforts. Officials seem to have decided that these reforms are
creating a political space that is generating unacceptable challenges
by activists and citizens to Party control of the system. For Chinese
leaders, this may represent a genie that must be stuffed back into
the bottle at all costs -even at the cost of curtailing the underlying
legal reforms aimed at resolving pervasive principal-agent
problems at the heart of Chinese governance.
This, of course, is but a partial solution. Central Chinese
officials still find themselves confronted with the need to come up
with mechanisms to effectively control and monitor their local
agents. Central authorities do not want to see local officials
abusing their official power to embezzle billions of dollars. Nor do
they want to see pervasive corruption facilitating food adulteration
practices that sicken hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens.
But if emphasizing the role of the judicial system in redressing
grievances against officials risks turning them into a venue for
politicized criticism of Party and state policies, and if establishing
procedural norms for the exercise of local government power risks
setting precedent that critics can turn against central government
actions, what options do they have?
One option is strengthening the use of responsibility systems.
These top-down systems offer central authorities a tool (albeit an
imperfect one) to force local officials to address particular issues of
concern and monitor their compliance. And importantly, since
control of these systems rests in the hands of higher authorities
rather than the citizenry at large, top-down responsibility systems
do not pose the same risks to Party control that elections or legal
channels do.
Central Chinese authorities are indeed calling for stronger
responsibility systems to address pressing problems facing China
today. Some Party documents contain positive calls for importing
bottom-up monitoring principles into the cadre evaluation
187 See CONG.-ExEcuTIvE COMM'N ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT, 109th Cong., at
81-83 (1st Sess. 2005) (detailing the development of the rule of law and the
institutions of democratic governance in China); CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM'N ON
CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT, 109th Cong., at 6 (2d Sess. 2006) (discussing regulatory
controls on the development of civil society, and official creation of a government-
controlled "mass organization" to supervise Chinese environmental groups).
[Vol. 31:1
HeinOnline  -- 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 120 2009-2010
RIOTS AND COVER-UPS
process. 188 But others rely heavily on traditional measures of
assigning strict and vicarious liability to individual Party and
government leaders for a range of governance failures. Central
Party authorities have re-emphasized the need for the "core
leader" (yibashou -generally, the party secretary) at each level of
the official Chinese hierarchy to personally bear liability for
maintaining social order.189  They also have called for
strengthening responsibility systems applying strict liability
principles for officials in political and legal organs.190 They have
made Party "clean government" responsibility systems a key
component of their 2008-2012 anti-corruption plan.191
Provincial and local authorities have followed suit. In the wake
of numerous scandals and disasters, they have implemented
responsibility systems tagging local Party secretaries with
vicarious liability for incidents of citizen petitions or protest,192
188 See, e.g., Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei, Jiangsu sheng renmin zhengfu
guanyu jianli cujin kexue fazhan de dangzheng lingdao banzi he lingdao ganbu
kaohe pingjia jizhi de yijian [Jiangsu Provincial Party and Government Opinion
on Creating Evaluation Mechanisms for Promoting Scientific Development
Among Party and Government Leadership Groups and Cadres], issued July 14,
2008 (P.R.C.).
189 Zhonggong zhongyang ban'gongting zhuanfa "Zhongyang zhengfa
weiyuanhui, zhongyang shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili weiyuanhui guanyu shenru
kaizhan ping'an jianshe de yijian" de tongzhi, [General Office of the Central Party
Committee Issues Notice on Distributing the 'Opinion of the CCP Politics and
Law Committee and Committee for the Comprehensive Management of Social
Order on Further Deepening Peaceful Construction], issued Oct. 21, 2005 (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/zcfg/2005-10/21/content_1915.htm.
190 See Zhongyang zhengfawei chutai yijian liu fangmian jiejue zhengfa gongzuo
tuchu wenti [Central Political-Legal Committee Issues Opinion Resolving Six Pressing
Problems With Political-Legal Work], LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 12, 2009, available at
http:/ /legaldaily.com.cn/2008fjdt/2009-02/12/content_1034299.htm (outlining
the Central Political-Legal Committee opinion that calls, in part for perfecting
social order responsibility systems and systematizing their use of "hard target"
(yipiaofoujue) principles).
191 Jianli jianquan chengzhi he yufang fubai tixi 2008-2012 nian gongzuo guihua
[2008-2012 Work Plan for Constructing and Perfecting a System for Punishing and
Preventing Corruption], XINHUA, June 22, 2008, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-06/22/content_8417974.htm.
192 See, e.g., Henan sheng wei zhengfu guanyu "ping'an henan jianshe
gangyao" de tongzhi [Henan Provincial Party Committee and Government
Circular Regarding the Issuance of the "Program for Construction of a Peaceful
Henan"], issued Apr. 26, 2006, art 2(1) (P.R.C.), translated in
http://sinolaw.typepad.com/chinese-lawandpolitics-/2007/03/translation
_hen.html.
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mine explosions,193 food safety problems, 94 unpaid migrant
worker wages, 195 and traffic accidents in their jurisdictions.196
Scratch the surface of any social, legal, or political problem in
China today, and you will find Party and government actors
falling over themselves to enact or amend a responsibility system
to address it.
Nor are courts immune from these trends. The Supreme
People's Court has required Chinese judges to bear individual
responsibility for resolving complaints and petitions by citizens
disgruntled as a result of their decisions.197 Pursuant to a 2005
central campaign aimed at addressing judicial enforcement
problems, Chinese authorities ordered the incorporation of court
enforcement statistics in relevant local social order responsibility
systems. These systems apply career sanctions based on vicarious
and strict liability for officials whose actions in enforcing judicial
verdicts result in citizen protests or other "mass incidents." 198
193 Tuixing dangzheng yibashou chengnuozhi chu shigu dangwei zerenren
[Promoting the Assurance System for Core Leaders in the Party and Government,
Responsibile Members of the Party Committee Will Bear Responsibility for
Accidents], YANTIAN QU ANQUAN SHENGCHAN JIANDU GUANLIJU [YANTIAN DIsTRIcr
WORK SAFETY BUREAU WEBSITE], Aug. 10, 2005,
http://www.ytsafety.gov.cn/viewnews.jsp?newslD=6758.
194 Zhoufeng xian shipin anquan zeren zhi [Zhoufeng County Food Product
Safety Responsibility System (Experimental)], issued Nov. 23, 2006 (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.slfs.gov.cn/Jgbm/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=152.
195 Guanyu zhiding youguan gongzuo zhidu qieshi jiejue jianshe lingyu
tuoqian gongcheng kuan he nongmingong gongzi wenti de tongzhi [Notice
Regarding Establishing Work Systems Related to Practically Resolving the
Problem of Unpaid Loans and Migrant Worker Back Wages in the Construction
Sector], Qiandongnan PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT WEBSITE, Nov. 25, 2006,
http://new.qdn.gov.cn/cms/cms/website/qdnzf/ jsp/page.jsp?channelId=150
&infoId=7239.
1% Guanyu jin yibu jiaqiang daolu jiaotong anquan gongzuo de jinji tongzhi
[Emergency Notice Regarding Further Strengthening Road Transportation Safety
Work], ANYUAN COUNTY WEBSITE, Sept. 4, 2008, art. 3, http://xxgk.ay.gov.cn
/bmgkxx/ajj/gzdt/zwdt/200809/t20080927_5117.htm.
197 Zhang Na, Zhu Yunfeng, Fan lie, Renmin fayuan tuixing faguan panhou dayi
zhidu [People's Courts to Promote System of Judges Responding to Post-Decision
Questions and Complaints], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE'S COURT DAILY], Nov. 3,
2005, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=183759.
198 For the full text of the relevant national directive, see Zhongyang zhengfa
wei guanyu qieshi jiejue renmin fayuan zhixing nan wenti [Central Political-Legal
Committee's Notice on Solving Enforcement Problems of Chinese Courts], issued
2005 (P.R.C.), available at http://wenda.tianya.cn/wenda/thread?Tid
=4d7dd29b54aa5aa6. For the relevant provincial documents issued jointly by the
Shaanxi High People's Court and the Shaanxi provincial branch of the Committee
for the Comprehensive Management of Public Security, see Guanyu jiang renmin
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Confronted with aggressive citizen use of legal institutions to
demand faster and deeper reform, Chinese central authorities may
be turning away from (or at least temporarily toning down) their
decades-long experiment with legal reform. They may have
decided that the risks associated with creating institutional bottom-
up mechanisms for citizen legal and political participation are too
great. For the near future, Chinese authorities may be bent on
strengthening top-down responsibility systems based on strict,
vicarious, and collective liability as a key tool to manage and direct
the Chinese state.
But this has real and serious costs. Extensive use of strict,
vicarious, and collective liability linked to responsibility targets as
a means to monitor local officials itself contributes to the riots,
cover-ups, and governance failures that central authorities seek to
avoid. Chinese leaders may find that their preferred short-term
monitoring strategy is actually undermining their own core long-
term interest -the stability of their country.
fayuan zhixing gongzuo naru shehui zhi'an zonghezhili mubiao kaohe fanwei de
yijian [Opinion Regarding Incorporating Court Enforcement Work into the Scope
of Targets for the Comprehensive Management of Public Security], SHAANXI
DAILY, July 14, 2007, available at http://news.shaanxi.gov.cn
/shownews.asp?id=65512; Quansheng fayuan zhixing gongzuo naru shehui
zhi'an zonghe zhili mubiao zeren kaohe xize [Evaluation Details for Incorporating
Court Enforcement Work Within Responsibility Systems for the Comprehensive
Management of Public Security], issued July 9, 2007 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.sxdaily.com.cn/data/flfg/20070709_98872322.htm. Note that these
systems also apply sanctions in situations where local authorities fail to support
judicial authorities who encounter violent resistance in enforcing verdicts, or
where mass protests result from local government failures to cooperate with or
carry out judicial verdicts. This may represent a potential tool by which judicial
authorities can draw upon the power of potential career sanctions to obtain
compliance of other government officials.
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